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HITTING BELOW THE BELT: FLORIDA’S TAXATION
OF PAY-PER-VIEW BOXING PROGRAMMING IS A
CONTENT-BASED VIOLATION OF THE FIRST
AMENDMENT
Joshua A. Stein*
Why are you a boxer, Irish featherweight champion Barry
McGuigan was asked. He said: “I can’t be a poet. I can’t tell
stories . . . .”1
INTRODUCTION
Numerous states authorize a boxing programming tax, imposed
on “telecast promoters,” and collected on gross receipts of all instate telecasts, regardless of where a boxing event takes place.2 No
similar tax is levied on other pay-per-view events,3 likely because
* Brooklyn Law School Class of 2006; Sc.B. Brown University, 2001. I
would like to thank my family, Arlene Stein, Jeffrey Stein, Jonathan Stein,
Mollie Stein and Amy Stein, for their constant love and support. I would also
like to thank all those who helped me during the writing process, especially
Victoria Baumfield. Finally, special thanks to Sean Griffin for helping me get
this note done “by will or by force,” and to Minh Tu Nguyen for being my muse
and all-around inspiration.
1
JOYCE CAROL OATES, ON BOXING 8 (1995)
2
See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 548.06 (West 2004) (promoters must pay 5%
tax on gross receipts of in-state pay-per-view telecasts); MO. REV. STAT. §
317.006 (2004) (promoters must pay 5% tax on gross receipts of in-state payper-view telecasts); 5 PA. CONS. STAT. § 916 (2004) (promoters must pay 3%
tax on gross receipts of in-state pay-per-view telecasts). State boxing
commissions may implement and administer these boxing programming taxes
via rule-making authority. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 548.06 (“The Florida State Boxing
Commission is created and is assigned to the Department of Business and
Professional Regulation for administrative and fiscal accountability purposes.”).
3
The statutory schemes in Florida, Pennsylvania and Missouri, for
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few pay-per-view programs generate as much revenue as boxing.4
Selectively taxing one type of pay-per-view program but no others
ought to be treated as a content-based violation of promoters’ First
Amendment rights. However, neither boxing, nor other sports,
have enjoyed first amendment protections. In a recent case, Top
Rank v. Florida State Boxing Commission, a Florida court
dismissed a First Amendment challenge to the special pay-perview tax on boxing and held that boxing is not a form of

example, have specific provisions for taxing pay-per-view boxing and wrestling,
yet none of these states have a similar provision taxing any other type of payper-view event. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 548.06; MO. REV. STAT. § 317.006; 5 PA.
CONS. STAT. § 916. However, boxing and wrestling are not the only live events
televised by pay-per-view—for instance, these states do not tax live telecasts of
pay-per-view concerts.
4
For example, the HBO pay-per-view broadcast of the Oscar De La HoyaBernard Hopkins middleweight-championship bout on September 18, 2004
generated $56 million in revenue (at $54.95 per buy). R. Thomas Umstead, Not
Golden, But Lucrative, MULTICHANNEL NEWS, Sept. 27, 2004, at 3 [herinafter
Umstead, Not Golden]. Heavyweight championships generate even more
substantial revenues: the Mike Tyson-Lennox Lewis bout garnered a record 1.8
million buys and $106.8 million in revenue. R. Thomas Umstead, Events
Struggle to Recapture Past Glory; Slumps for Boxing, Wrestling and Lack of
Marquee Events Spur a Falloff, MULTICHANNEL NEWS, May 3, 2004, at 90
[hereinafter Umstead, Events Struggle].
Moreover, pay-per-view boxing’s earning potential is enhanced by the
quantity of telecasts broadcast each month. According to Time Warner Cable of
New York City’s website, there will be at least four nationally distributed payper-view boxing telecasts in April 2006, ranging in price from $19.95-$44.95
per buy. Time Warner Cable of New York City, April 2006 Events, (April 26,
2006), available at http://www2.twcnyc.com/index2. cfm?c=ppv/events_re.
During the same month, there are two annual bodybuilding competitions (at
$19.95 and $29.95 per buy), one English Premier League Soccer season package
(at $19.95 per buy), , and one concert event (at $19.95 per buy).
In contrast, live concert pay-per-view broadcasts are significantly less
profitable. See Umstead, Not Golden, supra, at 3. According to Ken Hershman,
Senior Vice President and General Manager of Showtime Sports and Event
Programming, “performers themselves have become disenchanted with the
PPV-event category and would rather get a fee than assume the risks tied to buyrate performance.” Id. Faced with comparatively unfavorable economics, “the
[entertainment] industry has forced events like Britney [Spears] from what
would normally be PPV to Showtime.” Id.
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expression protected by the First Amendment.5
The Top Rank court relied on judicial opinions holding that
sports, such as college football and professional figure skating, are
not expressive conduct.6 The cases cited in Top Rank should not
stand for the blanket proposition that all sports are merely physical
activities.7 Instead, they can be better read as case-specific
analyses applying First Amendment speech doctrines to physical
conduct.8 In Spence v. Washington,9 the Supreme Court
emphasized two factors in determining whether conduct was
sufficiently communicative to constitute speech under the First
5

837 So. 2d 496 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1st Dist. 2003), cert. denied, 124 S. Ct.
1045 (2004).
6
Top Rank, 837 So. 2d at 498. The court summarily stated:
We recognize that athletic events provide people with a great deal
of entertainment. We, however, agree with the views expressed in
the previously cited cases that most athletic events do not convey
any message, symbolic or otherwise . . . . Thus, the regulated
activity in this case is clearly distinguishable from [a statute
imposing a financial burden on the speaker because of the content
of his speech].
Id. at 502 (emphasis added).
7
Id. at 502. In a footnote, Judge Wolf opined, “I am in fact an enthusiastic
sports fan, but I do not believe we should dilute the significance of First
Amendment protection by making it applicable to all athletic endeavors.” Id. at
502 n.1 (emphasis added). This footnote, coupled with the court’s prior
language, “most athletic events do not convey any message, symbolic or
otherwise,” Id. at 502 (emphasis added), precludes a reading of the case that
would support the blanket proposition that all athletic events do not convey any
message, symbolic or otherwise.
8
See Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 404 (1989); Spence v. Washington,
418 U.S. 405, 410 (1974). The relevant inquiry in First Amendment cases
involving expressive conduct is the subjective intent of the speaker in question
and the objective likelihood that his listeners will comprehend his message.
Johnson, 491 U.S. at 404; Spence, 418 U.S. at 410. The language in these cases
clearly indicates that the analysis should be applied to the conduct in question,
and makes no reference to similar conduct. However, as explained infra, the Top
Rank court appeared to incorporate “guilt by association” into its First
Amendment analysis, seemingly holding that if other sports could not be
categorized as expressive conduct under the First Amendment, neither should
boxing.
9
418 U.S. 405 (1974).

STEIN MACROED CORRECTED 07-30-06.DOC

1002

7/30/2006 12:36 PM

JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY

Amendment: the intent to convey a “particularized message” and,
given the surrounding circumstances, the likelihood that the
message would be understood by those who viewed it.10 Since time
immemorial, fighting has been a form of expression,11 and the
sport of boxing is merely a legal fight sanctioned by the state.12
Further, in the sport of boxing, each fight conveys its own
particular message.13 For example, Joe Louis, a black fighter,
defeated German Heavyweight Max Schmeling in 1938 and singlehandedly debunked the Nazi propaganda machine in front of the
world.14 Boxing deserves the First Amendment protections that
have been granted to other physical, yet expressive, conduct.15
However, whether boxing receives full or partial protection under
the First Amendment, pay-per-view boxing programming taxes are
content-based regulations subject to strict scrutiny because they
single out boxing, while no other pay-per-view events are similarly
taxed.16
This Note critiques the holding in Top Rank v. Florida State
10

Id. at 410-11.
See MICHAEL B. POLIAKOFF, COMBAT SPORTS IN THE ANCIENT WORLD:
COMPETITION, VIOLENCE, AND CULTURE 113-115 (1995) (discussing how, inter
alia, boxers in ancient societies expressed their status as heroes and benefactors
to society by engaging in their sport.)
12
See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 548.008 decrees that professional or
amateur fights which do not meet the requirements set forth by either Chapter
548 of the Florida Statutes or promulgated by the Florida State Boxing
Commission are subject to criminal liability. Fighters are subject to criminal
penalties.
13
See, e.g., Norman Mailer, King of the Hill, in JOYCE CAROL OATES &
DANIEL HALPERN, READING THE FIGHTS 124 (1988).
14
See generally CHRIS MEAD, CHAMPION: JOE LOUIS 137-50 (1986).
15
At the very least, boxing is as expressive as nude dancing, which is
recognized as “speech.” Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560 (1991).
16
Leathers v. Medlock, 499 U.S. 439, 447 (1991) (utilizing strict scrutiny
to invalidate discriminatory taxes imposed upon some speakers but not others).
See also Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of the N.Y. State Crime Victims
Bd., 502 U.S. 105, 112 (1991) (statute inflicting a financial burden on speakers
because of the content of their speech is “presumptively inconsistent with the
First Amendment”); Arkansas Writers’ Project, Inc. v. Ragland, 481 U.S. 221,
231 (1987) (content-based speech restrictions are invalid unless narrowly
tailored to promote a “compelling state interest”).
11
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Boxing Commission that boxing events are not subject to the
protections of the First Amendment, and proposes that boxing can
pass the test set forth by the Supreme Court in Spence v.
Washington,17 whereby conduct can be deemed expressive speech.
Part I examines the Top Rank decision against Supreme Court
decisions which extend First Amendment protections beyond
speakers to protect promoters of speech, as well as other decisions
by courts which have considered similar boxing-specific taxes on
pay-per-view broadcasts. Part II analyzes the cases which the Top
Rank court used to support its determination that boxing is mere
sport which is undeserving of the protections of the First
Amendment. Lastly, Part III presents an historical and literary
analysis of boxing in order to demonstrate that boxing satisfies the
Spence test and is worthy of the protections of the First
Amendment.
I. THE TOP RANK DECISION
Top Rank, Inc. is a Nevada corporation that promotes boxing
matches and produces pay-per-view cable television boxing
programs.18 The company is run by International Boxing Hall of
Fame promoter Bob Arum, whose stable of talent has included
Muhammad Ali, Roberto Duran, George Foreman, Joe Frazier,
Larry Holmes, Marvin Hagler, Thomas Hearns, “Sugar” Ray
Leonard, and Oscar De La Hoya.19 Arum has participated in most
of the top-grossing fights in boxing history such as HaglerLeonard, Chavez-De La Hoya, Holyfield-Foreman, Ali-Frazier II
and both Ali-Spinks fights.20
The controversy in Top Rank revolved around several matches
promoted by Top Rank, held outside the state of Florida, and
subject to taxation in Florida under FLA. STAT. ANN. § 548.06 and
FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 61K1-1.042. Florida’s Joe Lang
17

418 U.S. 405, 410 (1974).
Top Rank v. Florida State Boxing Commission, 837 So. 2d 496, 497-98
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1st Dist. 2003), cert. denied, 124 S.Ct. 1045 (2004).
19
Top Rank, Inc., A Look @ Bob Arum, http://www.toprank.
com/Bob.htm.
20
Id.
18
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Kershaw Act regulates the sports of professional boxing and
kickboxing within the state of Florida.21 The relevant portion of the
Kershaw Act requires that boxing promoters22 pay a tax of five
percent on the “gross receipts”23 derived from boxing matches.24
The Act empowers the Florida State Boxing Commission to
promulgate and enforce implementing regulations.25 Specifically,
Rule 61K1-1.042 requires promoters to pay a five percent tax on
each telecast of a pay-per-view boxing event ordered by a Florida
subscriber. The rule applies to all matches “viewed within Florida,
whether originating in Florida or not.”26
In 2000, Top Rank challenged the portions of the Act that
imposed taxes on pay-per-view boxing events featuring matches
held outside the state of Florida.27 Because the tax applies only to
boxing programming, Top Rank alleged that it was a content-based
restriction on speech violative of the First Amendment.28 Top Rank
sought a refund of taxes already paid, as well as an injunction
against the imposition of further taxes under the Florida statute and
implementing regulations.29 The trial court granted the Florida
Boxing Commission’s motion for summary judgment, finding
§548.06 facially valid.30
On appeal, the District Court of Appeal for Florida upheld the
trial court’s ruling, holding that a boxing match is not pure nor
symbolic speech, thus declining to extend First Amendment

21

FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 548.001-.079 (2004).
The Act defines “promoter” as “any person. . .who produces, arranges, or
stages any match involving a professional.” FLA. STAT. ANN. § 548.02(19).
23
The Kershaw Act defines taxable “gross receipts” to include income
from ticket sales, concessions and the “gross price charged for the sale or lease
of broadcasting, television, and motion picture rights.” FLA. STAT. ANN. §
548.06(1)(a)-(c).
24
Id. at § 548.06.
25
FLA. STAT. ANN. at § 548.003; FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 61K-1.001, et
seq. (2004).
26
FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 61K1-1.042(4).
27
Top Rank, 837 So. 2d at 497-99.
28
Id.
29
Id.
30
Id. at 498.
22
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protection to the promoters of a boxing match.31 The Court framed
this issue as “whether boxing, an athletic event where the
participants are attempting to win prize money, is a form of
conduct containing elements of communication or involving pure
speech or symbolic speech protected by the First Amendment.”32
The court opined that “[I]n its most basic form, athletic
competition does not constitute pure speech; rather, participation in
athletic competition constitutes physical activity or conduct.”33
Analogizing boxing to professional wrestling, college football and
surfing, the court concluded that “most athletic events do not
convey any message, symbolic or otherwise,” that would allow for
protection under the First Amendment.34 The court did not take
into account any differences between boxing and the
aforementioned sports, but instead relied on “guilt by
association”—since courts have held that other sports are mere
conduct, the Top Rank court simply concluded that boxing matches
must be mere conduct as well.35 Judge Wolf (who is not an expert
on the sport of boxing) found that the only message conveyed by a
boxing match is each fighter’s attempt to win prize money.36 As
such, boxing is not sufficiently imbued with elements of
communication to warrant First Amendment protection.37
A. Boxing Promoters are Members of the Media
Florida’s tax on pay-per-view boxing telecasts runs afoul of the
First Amendment, irrespective of whether the sport of boxing itself
is speech because boxing promoters are members of the media.
Taxation discriminating against members of the media implicates
the First Amendment regardless of the content of the underlying
speech, but the Top Rank court held that Top Rank was not a
31

Id.
Top Rank, 837 So. 2d at 500 (emphasis added).
33
Id. (citing Justice v. NCAA, 577 F. Supp. 356 (D. Ariz. 1983) (declining
to extend First Amendment protection to college football)).
34
Id. at 502 (internal citations omitted).
35
Id.
36
Id. at 500-02.
37
Id.
32
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“member of the media” and therefore the First Amendment did not
apply.38
On the issue of Top Rank’s status as a First Amendment
speaker, the District Court of Appeal found that since boxing
promoters were not commonly regarded as members of the media,
they were too far removed from the actual speech in question to be
considered a medium of communication.39 The trial court drew a
distinction between Top Rank as promoter and Showtime, the
television broadcaster of the pay-per-view event at issue.40 Top
Rank is a licensed boxing promoter responsible for “[arranging]
live professional boxing events.”41 These events are in turn made
available to consumers on a pay-per-view basis through licensing
agreements with various distributors or broadcasters.42 Top Rank is
the sine qua non of the entire event. Regardless of whether Top
Rank is characterized as a member of the media, the government’s
power to impose content-based taxes on speech should not vary
based on the speaker’s identity.43 Indeed, any entity contracting
with a First Amendment speaker to transmit his speech becomes
part of the medium of communication.44
In Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of the N.Y. State Crime
Victims Bd., the Supreme Court struck down New York’s “Son-of-

38
39
40

Top Rank, 837 So. 2d at 500.
Id. at 498.
Id.
Showtime claimed that it could be considered a promoter under
Florida law and thus potentially liable for the tax; it joined Top
Rank and America Presents in filing a complaint in which the three
sought declaratory and injunctive relief based on allegations that the
statute imposing the tax is unconstitutional under the First
Amendment. The trial court granted a motion to dismiss Showtime
on the basis that Showtime lacked standing since it had not yet been
assessed the boxing tax.

Id.
41

Id.
Id.
43
Simon & Schuster v. Members of the N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 502
U.S. 105, 117 (1991).
44
Id.
42
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Sam” law45 as content-based restriction on the dissemination of
speech by the media.46 New York’s Son-of-Sam Law required that
an accused or convicted criminal’s income from works describing
his crime be deposited in an escrow account; these funds were used
to reimburse crime victims for the harm they had suffered.47 Simon
& Schuster involved the contract that led to Nicholas Pileggi’s
book Wiseguy: Life in a Mafia Family, which eventually became
Martin Scorsese’s hit mob film “Goodfellas.” 48 In August 1981,
admitted organized crime figure Henry Hill entered into a contract
with author Nicholas Pileggi for the production of a book about
Hill’s life. Subsequently, publisher Simon & Schuster entered into
a publishing agreement under which Simon & Schuster agreed to
make payments to both Hill and Pileggi.49 The collaboration
between Hill and Pileggi resulted in Wiseguy, a first-person
narrative in which Hill “depicts in colorful detail, the day-to-day
existence of organized crime.”50 “Throughout Wiseguy, Hill
frankly admits to having participated in an astonishing variety of
crimes.”51
On May 21, 1987, the New York State Victim’s Crime Board
ordered Simon & Schuster to suspend all payments to Hill pursuant
45

N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 632-a (McKinney 1982 and Supp. 1991). The “Sonof-Sam” law gained its name from serial killer David Berkowitz, a/k/a the “Son
of Sam.” Between 1976 and 1977, Berkowitz went on a killing spree around the
city of New York that left seven dead and six others injured.
Firstamendmentcenter.org,
“Son-of-Sam”
Laws,
Oct.
31,
2005,
http://www.firstamendmentcenter.org/Speech/arts/topic.aspx?topic=son_of_sam
. Berkowitz’s “Son of Sam” moniker came from his claim that a ghost named
Sam spoke to him through his neighbor’s dog and ordered him to kill his
victims. Id. After Berkowitz pled guilty and was sentenced to 365 years in jail,
he was offered “substantial sums of money” for the rights to his story. Id. In
response to this, the New York Legislature passed N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 632-a to
prevent criminals from profiting from their crimes, and to recompense the
victims. Id.
46
Simon & Schuster, 502 U.S. at 118-21.
47
N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 632-a.
48
Simon & Schuster, 502 U.S. at 112-15.
49
Id. at 112.
50
Id.
51
Id.
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to the “Son-of-Sam” law:
The Board determined that Wiseguy was covered by N.Y.
EXEC. LAW § 632-a, that Simon & Schuster had violated
the law by failing to turn over its contract with Hill to the
Board and by making payments to Hill, and that all money
owed to Hill under the contract had to be turned over to the
Board to be held in escrow for the victims of Hill’s crimes.
The Board ordered Hill to turn over the payments he had
already received, and ordered Simon & Schuster to turn
over all money payable to Hill at the time or in the future.52
As a threshold matter, the Court found that the “Son-of-Sam”
law was a content-based restriction and therefore subject to strict
scrutiny. The law “single[d] out income derived from expressive
activity for a burden the State place[d] on no other income, and it
[was] directed only at works with a specified content,” i.e.,
crime.53 Since a statute that imposes a financial burden on speakers
because of the content of their speech “is presumptively
inconsistent with the First Amendment,” the Court held that the
statute was subject to strict scrutiny.54 It was of no import to the
Court whether the First Amendment speaker was Henry Hill, who
was taxed “because of the story he has told,” or Simon & Schuster,
which published books as a result of those stories. The tax at issue
operated as a “disincentive to speak,” with respect to the content of
the speech, not the identity of the speaker. 55
Even if Henry Hill, not Simon & Schuster, was the “speaker,”
the tax was still a content-based restriction of the “media.”56 The
Court dismissed the Board’s argument that even if the First
Amendment prohibits content-based financial regulation the
media, the Son-of-Sam law was different, since it imposed “a
general burden on any ‘entity’ contracting with a convicted person
to transmit that person’s speech.57 The Court, however, held that
whether the actor is characterized as a “member of the media” is
52
53
54
55
56
57

Id. at 114-15.
Id. at 115-16.
Simon & Schuster, 502 U.S. at 115-16.
Id. at 116-17.
Id. at 117.
Id. at 117.
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irrelevant, for “[t]he government’s power to impose content-based
financial disincentives on speech surely does not vary with the
identity of the speaker.”58 Indeed, prior to its decision in Simon &
Schuster, the Supreme Court applied strict scrutiny to contentbased regulation of cable broadcasts in Leathers v. Medlock.59
B. Content-Based Taxation Warrants Strict Scrutiny
Even if the sport of boxing itself did not fall within the ambit
of protected speech under the First Amendment, the Kershaw Act
still ought to be subject to strict scrutiny. “A tax on the
dissemination of entertainment based on content must pass strict
scrutiny, regardless of its subject matter.”60 Content-based speech
restrictions are thus subject to strict scrutiny, and they are invalid
unless “necessary to serve a compelling state interest” and
“narrowly drawn to achieve that end.”61 The Supreme Court has
applied this principle to taxes on speech, utilizing strict scrutiny to
invalidate discriminatory taxes imposed upon some speakers but
not others.62 Laws burdening speech “must satisfy the same
rigorous scrutiny” as laws “banning speech.”63
Denying Top Rank the status of speaker in the Florida case,
deprived the promoter of the benefit of strict scrutiny of the
Kershaw Act. The Florida regulation does not apply a general tax
to all pay-per-view events. Instead, Florida’s Kershaw Act singles
out pay-per-view boxing for taxation.64 There is no other Florida
58

Id.
Leathers v. Medlock, 499 U.S. 439, 444 (1991).
60
United States Satellite Broad. Co. v. Lynch, 41 F. Supp. 2d 1113, 1121
(D. Cal. 1999) (citing Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of the N.Y. State
Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 105, 115 (1991); Arkansas Writers’ Project, Inc. v.
Ragland, 481 U.S. 221, 230 (1987)).
61
Arkansas Writers’ Project, 481 U.S. at 231.
62
See Leathers v. Medlock, 499 U.S. 439, 447 (1991).
63
United States v. Playboy Entertainment Group, Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 812
(2000).
64
See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 548.06. Presently, there is no information as to
whether the Florida Boxing Commission has enforced the pay-per-view tax as to
telecasts of other pugilistic exhibitions as set forth in FLA. STAT. ANN. § 548.002
(kickboxing and mixed martial arts).
59
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statute taxing any other type of pay-per-view telecast, even though
there is a multitude of pay-per-view events besides boxing.65
Accordingly, the tax should be subject to strict scrutiny and should
have been invalidated unless Florida could show that it is narrowly
tailored to promote a compelling state interest. Florida’s tax on
boxing telecasts cannot meet this burden. In enacting the Kershaw
Act, neither the Florida legislature nor the Florida State Boxing
65

Compare FLA. STAT. ANN. § 548.06 (promoters must pay 5% tax on
gross receipts of in-state pay-per-view telecasts) and FLA. STAT. ANN. §
548.002(19) (defining “promoter” as “any person . . . who produces, arranges, or
stages any match involving a professional”), with FLA. STAT. ANN. § 202.12
(levies a tax upon “every person who engages in the business of selling
communications services at retail in [the state of Florida]”); FLA. STAT. ANN. §
202.19 (“The governing authority of each county and municipality [in Florida]
may, by ordinance, levy a discretionary communications services tax); FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 202.11 (3) (defines “communications services” as any point-topoint “transmission, conveyance, or routing of . . . cable services by any
conceivable means) and FLA. STAT. ANN. § 202.11(2) (defines “cable service”
as “the transmission of video, audio, or other programming service to
purchasers, and the purchaser interaction, if any, required for the selection or use
of any such programming service . . . including . . . pay-per-view [services]).
The only other Florida statute to address the concept of pay-per-view is the
Communications Services Tax Simplification Law (FLA. STAT. ANN. § § 202.10,
et seq.) [hereinafter CS Tax]. In contrast to the Kershaw Act, the CS Tax does
not single out any type of service or provider. Conversely, the CS Tax casts a
broad net, taxing nearly every means and provider of audio, video data, and
other types of information or signals. In fact, the CS Tax’s drafters appeared to
have gone to great lengths to do so, viz., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 202.11 (delineating
the CS Tax’s scope in broad terms with very narrow exceptions). For example,
in defining “cable service,” the framers purported to cover every link in the
information supply chain. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 202.11 (2). Moreover, the
framers intended for the CS Act’s scope to remain broad in the future, viz., FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 202.11 (3) (defines means or method of “transmission,
conveyance, or routing of voice, data, audio, video, or any other information or
signals” to encompass both any medium or method “now in existence or
hereafter devised, regardless of the protocol used for such transmission or
conveyance”).
On the other hand, the Kershaw Act pertains exclusively to the taxation of
boxing. Unlike the CS Tax, which covers to every means, method and provider
within its broad jurisdiction (communications), the Kershaw Act is simply a
device to tax all revenue streams to flowing through its narrow jurisdiction
(pugilistic exhibitions). See also supra note 4.
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Commission included findings to support the proposition that the
tax on boxing programming furthers a legitimate state interest. The
generation of tax revenue is not a sufficient justification for a
content-based speech restriction.66 Since Florida’s content-based
burden on speech lacks a compelling interest in the taxation of
pay-per-view boxing programming, the tax is unconstitutional. The
Top Rank court erred in upholding the tax, and Top Rank should
have prevailed.
Florida’s isolation of boxing for special tax treatment is
equivalent to an Oregon boxing tax held to be a content-based
restriction in TVKO v. Howland,67 as well as a California boxing
tax that the court refused to enforce in United States Satellite
Broad. Co. v. Lynch.68 “[I]f no [boxing] match is shown, no tax is
imposed.”69 Thus, like the taxes in TVKO and U.S. Satellite, the
Kershaw Act constitutes a content-based restriction on speech.70
1. United States Satellite Broad. Co. v. Lynch
In United States Satellite Broad. Co. v. Lynch, the U.S. District
Court for the Eastern District of California struck down a
California statute71 imposing a five percent gross receipts tax
exclusively on telecasts of boxing and other combat sports,
because it inflicted an unjustified financial burden on the speaker.72
The controversy in that case centered on U.S. Satellite’s refusal to
pay the tax following the live pay-per-view broadcast of the
66

See Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Minn. Comm’r of Revenue, 460
U.S. at 585 (1983).
67
15 Or. Tax 335 (2001), aff’d, 335 Or. 527 (2003).
68
United States Satellite Broadcasting Co. v. Lynch, 41 F. Supp. 2d 1113
(E.D. Cal. 1999).
69
TVKO, 15 Or. Tax at 345.
70
Although the TVKO and U.S. Satellite cases deal with taxes levied on
broadcasters of pay-per-view boxing, rather than on promoters of the telecast,
the analysis as to whether such regulations are facially content-based is the same
because in each case, assuming that boxing is expressive conduct, the laws in
question deal with the telecast of speech protected under the First Amendment.
71
CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 18600 et seq. (1999).
72
U.S. Satellite, 41 F. Supp. 2d at 1121-22.
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infamous fight between Evander Holyfield and Mike Tyson on
June 28, 1997.73 The fight took place in Nevada; U.S. Satellite’s
only contact with the state of California in the matter arose from its
sale of telecasts within the state.74
The U.S. Satellite court held that a tax on the dissemination of
entertainment based on content must pass First Amendment strict
scrutiny, regardless of its subject matter.75 It observed that it does
not matter whether the First Amendment protects or even applies
to boxing.76 Rejecting the defendants’ argument that pay-per-view
boxing telecasts should not enjoy First Amendment protection
because “boxing is somehow ‘less valuable’ than other subjects,”
the court stated:
The First Amendment does not protect murder, yet the
court feels confident that news broadcasts of murder,
killing, or war may not be censored to suppress their
content. Nor is a hurricane protected by the First
Amendment; yet a broadcaster with an audience has a right
under the First Amendment to broadcast images of a
hurricane.77
To hold otherwise would “[run] contrary to every principle of
the Free Speech Clause itself.”78 Thus, taxing a pay-per-view
broadcast based on its content must pass strict scrutiny, regardless
of its underlying subject matter.79
The court further held that such a tax did not advance a
compelling state interest, and even if it had, it was not narrowly
tailored to advance that interest.80 The court dismissed California’s
general interest in raising revenue as insufficient to justify a
content-based tax on speech, opining that “while speech may be
taxed to help pay for the costs created by the speech itself . . . the
73

This was the fight where referee Mills Lane disqualified Mike Tyson
because he bit off Evander Holyfield’s ear.
74
U.S. Satellite, 41 F. Supp. 2d at 1116.
75
Id. at 1121.
76
U.S. Satellite, 41 F. Supp. 2d at 1121.
77
Id.
78
Id.
79
Id.
80
Id.
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state may not merely use supposed ‘administrative costs’ as a guise
for raising revenue.”81 One of the “administrative costs” claimed
by California was “its efforts to keep boxing clean.”82 The court
was unconvinced that this was a compelling interest because the
California Boxing Commission did not mention the yearly cost of
“keeping boxing clean.”83 Thus, even if the court concluded that
the state had raised compelling interests, it could not conclude that
the tax in question was narrowly tailored to serve them.84 The
Commission also “[presented] no evidence or argument
whatsoever on the amount of the costs, if any, incurred to the
Commission by plaintiff’s telecasts into private homes of boxing
matches which occur in another state.”85 Furthermore, the court
noted that the Commission deposited tax revenues in the state
general fund, and “did not directly spend all of the revenues raised
by the tax.”86
The U.S. Satellite court held that the imposition of the tax on
tickets sold to live boxing events held in California did not justify
extending that tax to pay-per-view broadcasts of boxing events
regardless of whether they were held in California.87 The court
found that the state’s argument that the tax prevented promoters
from evading the live events tax by moving their matches out of
state “simply [devolved] to the [general] interest in raising
revenue, which [did] not justify a content-specific tax.”88 The court
likewise rejected the contention that the tax served as an equalizer
“to avoid disadvantaging promoters of live matches in California.”
89
The court opined that promoters of live boxing matches in
California would be better served via a tax structure that “made no
reference to the content of the telecast.”90
81
82
83
84
85
86
87
88
89
90

U.S. Satellite, 41 F. Supp. 2d at 1121-22.
Id. at 1122.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
U.S. Satellite, 41 F. Supp. 2d at 1122-23.
Id. at 1123.
Id.
Id.
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2. TVKO v. Howland

More recently, in TVKO v. Howland, the Supreme Court of
Oregon also held that taxing television transmissions of boxing
matches held out of state is repugnant to the First Amendment.91 In
that case, an Oregon statute would have required the distributor of
a pay-per-view boxing match that took place in New York City to
pay a 6% tax on gross receipts earned on the broadcast within the
state of Oregon.92 The TVKO court noted that the tax in question
was only imposed upon the telecasts or transmissions of boxing
matches; simply put, “[I]f no [boxing] match is shown, no tax is
imposed.”93 Since the tax was content-based, it was subject to strict
scrutiny.94
Subsequently, the court refused to find any of Oregon’s
proffered interests in the tax sufficiently compelling to justify its
disparate treatment of boxing.95 Oregon has a legitimate interest in
regulating boxing matches in that state.96 Indeed, the court noted
that the state may promulgate “such laws, rules, or regulations as it
deems necessary or good to protect the public’s health and
welfare.”97 However, taxing the broadcast of an out-of-state boxing
match did nothing to further this goal, but was instead a circuitous
and unjustified attempt to regulate communication.98
Even if Oregon had a legitimate interest in regulating
communication, the court held that the tax was not narrowly
tailored to achieve that end.99 Specifically, the court rejected the
state’s argument that the tax paid for the industry in which TVKO

91

TVKO v. Howland, 15 Or. Tax 335, 343-45 (2001), aff’d, 335 Or. 527
(2003). The TVKO court passed on the issue of whether the tax as applied to instate telecasts was also unconstitutional.
92
TVKO, 15 Or. Tax at 337-38.
93
Id. at 345.
94
Id. at 344.
95
Id. at 344-45.
96
Id.
97
Id. at 345.
98
Id.
99
TVKO, 15 Or. Tax at 346.

STEIN MACROED CORRECTED 07-30-06.DOC

PAY-PER-VIEW BOXING TAXATION

7/30/2006 12:36 PM

1015

did business.100 The court emphasized that TVKO’s only
connection to Oregon was the broadcast of a boxing match that
took place outside of Oregon.101 Accordingly, Oregon had no
jurisdiction to regulate boxing matches held outside the state.102
II. SPORTS AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT
In Top Rank, the District Court of Appeals for Florida not only
denied Top Rank status as a speaker, but also denied that boxing,
or any sport, was protected by the First Amendment. The Supreme
Court has yet to rule on whether sport in general is entitled to First
Amendment protection. However, the Court has firmly established
that the First Amendment’s guarantee of freedom of speech applies
to conduct, as well as words. The Court set forth the test for
determining what conduct constitutes protected speech in Spence v.
Washington.103 Under the Spence test, conduct constitutes
protected speech when there exists: (i) an intent to convey a
specific message, and (ii) a substantial likelihood that the message
would be understood by those receiving it.104
Entertainment, as well as political and ideological speech, is
protected by the First Amendment.105 This protection applies to
speech “in any medium that either informs or entertains,
[including] books, motion pictures, radio, television programs, live
entertainment, poetry, painting, music, dramatic works, comics and
commercials.”106 Indeed, all ideas having “even the slightest
redeeming social importance” have full protection under the First
Amendment.107 Thus, video games,108 live music,109 and even nude
100

Id.
Id at 145-46.
102
Id.
103
418 U.S. 405 (1974).
104
Johnson, 491 U.S. at 404; Spence, 418 U.S. at 410.
105
See Schad v. Borough of Mount Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61 (1981) (holding
that live entertainment is speech); Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 433
U.S. 562 (1977) (holding that broadcast entertainment is speech).
106
Doe v. TCI Cablevision of Missouri, 30 Media L. Rep. 2409 (Mo. Ct.
App. 2002).
107
Roth v. U.S., 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
101
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dancing110 enjoy first Amendment protection.
The Court stated in Roth v. United States, “the protection given
speech and press was fashioned to assure unfettered interchange of
ideas for bringing about of political and social changes desired by
the people.”111 All ideas having “even the slightest redeeming
social importance—unorthodox ideas, controversial ideas, even
ideas hateful to the prevailing climate of opinion—have the full
protection of the guaranties, unless excludable because they
encroach upon the limited area of more important interests.”112
Boxing meets this minimum standard of having “even the slightest
redeeming social importance.” Whether viewed as simply a fight
divorced from its illegal components, entertainment, or as a contest
capable of expressing a social or political message,113 the sport of
boxing is more than mere conduct.
A. Sports and the Outer Perimeters of Speech
The Top Rank court relied on cases involving sports, in which
the deciding courts were reluctant to apply the protections of the
First Amendment to conduct that does not fall within the
traditional notions of political and ideological speech.114 Some of
those cases precede the Supreme Court’s decision in Spence v
Washington, in which a test was formulated for determining
whether conduct may be considered expressive speech.115 All of
the cases relied on by the Top Rank court predate the Supreme
Court’s recognition of First Amendment protection for promoters
of speech, as in Simon & Schuster. These examinations of sports
were all considered prior to the Supreme Court’s holding in Barnes
v. Glen Theatre, Inc. that the First Amendment may protect
108

E.g., Video Software Dealers Ass’n v. Maleng, 325 F. Supp. 2d 1180
(W.D. Wash. 2004).
109
E.g., Collins v. Ainsworth, 382 F.3d 529 (5th Cir. 2004)
110
E.g., Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560 (1991).
111
Roth, 354 U.S. at 484.
112
Id. at 484-85.
113
As did the Schmeling-Lewis fight.
114
See discussion, Part II.A.5.
115
Spence, 418 U.S. at 410.
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expression on “the outer perimeters of the First Amendment.”116
Lastly, the cases relied on by the decision in Top Rank reflect the
dilution of First Amendment protections which occurs when free
speech is pled while seeking equitable relief from courts.
1. Murdock v. City of Jacksonville: Professional Wrestling
In Murdock v. City of Jacksonville, the United States Court for
the Middle District of Florida held that professional wrestling was
not speech.117 In that case, a private wrestling promoter challenged
a resolution of the Jacksonville City Council granting an exclusive
lease to a competing wrestling promoter, which effectively
prohibited him from holding professional wrestling matches in the
Jacksonville Coliseum.118 In addition to other claims, the promoter
argued that the exclusive lease on the public venue prevented him
from “entertaining large crowds for wrestling matches” and thus
violated his right to free speech under the First Amendment.119
While the court in Murdock acknowledged that the First
Amendment applied to symbolic speech, it held that protection
does not extend to a “purely entertainment pastime” such as
wrestling or the promotion of a wrestling match for
entertainment.120 The court noted that the First Amendment was
meant to protect acts such as speech by a political figure, and
placed heavy emphasis on its notion that entertainment “is just not
free speech, akin to free speech, nor a symbolic act.”121 However,
in subsequent years, the Supreme Court has rejected the
proposition that the First Amendment does not apply to
116

Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 565-66 (1991). As stated in
one of the cases discussed below, “exposition of an athletic exercise is on the
periphery of protected speech (for the purposes of a balancing of conflicting
interests), as opposed, for example, to political speech, which is the core of the
First Amendment protection.” Post Newsweek Stations-Connecticut, v.
Travelers Ins. Co., 510 F. Supp. 81 (D. Conn. 1981).
117
361 F. Supp. 1083 (D. Fla. 1973).
118
Id. at 1085.
119
Id.
120
Id. at 1086.
121
Id. at 1096 (internal quotations omitted).
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entertainment.122 The holding in Murdock rests on the premise that
a sporting event should be denied First Amendment protection on
the ground that it is promoted for the purpose of entertainment,123
but more recent Supreme Court decisions have held that the scope
of the First Amendment extends beyond political speech.124
Intervening change in First Amendment jurisprudence aside,
the Murdock court had additional reasons to find against the
promoter. The plaintiff sought an order directing the City of
Jacksonville “to rent the [Jacksonville Coliseum] to him on any
open days of the week,”125 relief that the plaintiff should not have
expected from the court. The court noted that “mandamus will not
lie to review or control the acts of public officers in respect to
matters as to which they are vested with discretion.”126 Since “the
decision of whether to lease City property,” as well as to whom it
will be leased, rested with the City of Jacksonville, it was a
discretionary task and not subject to mandamus.127 At most, the
resolution vested impermissible discretion in Jacksonville city
officials.128 The resolution at issue neither banned nor inhibited
professional wrestling matches; it merely determined that only one
promoter would be permitted to present wrestling matches in the
Jacksonville Coliseum during the pendency of the lease.
As in further cases below, the request for inapposite relief in
Matlock caused the court to find against First Amendment
protection with respect to conduct on the fringes of expression.

122

E.g., Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 433 U.S. 562 (1977).
See Murdock, 361 F. Supp. at 1086.
124
See, e.g., Schad v. Borough of Mount Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61 (1981)
(First Amendment protection extended to live entertainment); Zacchini v.
Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 433 U.S. 562 (1977) (First Amendment protection
extended to broadcast entertainment).
125
Murdock, 361 F. Supp. at 1096.
126
Id.
127
Id.
128
Id. Although “a public official may not be vested with broad discretion
for determining arbitrarily and without standards in what manner and by whom
activities protected by the First [Amendment] may be conducted.” Id. (internal
citation omitted). However, the court did not reach the issue, since it determined
that wrestling was protected speech.
123
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2. Post Newsweek Stations-Connecticut v. Travelers Ins. Co.:
Figure Skating
The Top Rank court relied on Post Newsweek StationsConnecticut v. Travelers Ins. Co.129 as holding that figure skating
“[does] not convey any message, symbolic or otherwise” sufficient
to bring it under the ambit of the First Amendment.130 Post
Newsweek can better be read as standing for the proposition that
courts will not allow parties to use the First Amendment to
circumvent the express terms of a contract negotiated at arms’
length. Contract provisions prohibiting a television station from
broadcasting footage of the 1981 World Figure Skating
Championships were challenged on First Amendment grounds in
Post Newsweek. The network holding the exclusive broadcast
rights required contracting stations to wait until the network had
completed its broadcast of the event, which was conducted at the
Hartford Civic Center and operated by the City of Hartford.131 The
plaintiff television station asserted that the denial of television
coverage restricted its First Amendment right “to provide
immediate reporting” of the newsworthy event and sought a
preliminary injunction to allow it to broadcast despite the
contractual agreement.132
The Post Newsweek court did not apply the Spence test to the
sport of figure skating; rather, the case was analyzed as a
restriction on the use of a public forum. The court decided the case
“by weighing the nature of the forum and the conflicting interests
involved.”133 On the one hand, the court considered the severity of
the restriction on the plaintiff, which it found did not amount to
censorship. On the other hand, the court considered the impact on
the public at large and decided that allowing plaintiff to broadcast
the World Figure Skating Championships via television would
severely diminish the commercial value of the event.134 Even
129
130
131
132
133
134

510 F. Supp. 81 (D.C. Conn. 1981).
Top Rank, 837 So. 2d at 502.
Post, 510 F. Supp at 83-84.
Id. at 84.
Id. at 87.
Id. at 84. The court refused to factor into its calculus the worldwide
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though the plaintiffs could not broadcast live television coverage,
“[t]he general public [had] ready access to the event, the event
[would] be reported by newspaper and radio media without any
time or manner restriction, and the plaintiff [was allowed] attend
and report on the [figure skating] championships. . . .”135
The court held that the “exposition of an athletic exercise is on
the periphery of protected speech (for the purposes of a balancing
of conflicting interests), as opposed, for example, to political
speech, which is the core of the first amendment [sic]
protection.”136 Noting that figure skating is a “uniquely visual
sport,” the court decided that a live television broadcast would
diminish the “commercial value” of the World Figure Skating
Championships in a way that newspaper or radio coverage would
not.137 Allowing plaintiffs to cover the event in spite of the
restriction would amount to a constitutional right of special access
to the event.138 Such a right would jeopardize revenue resulting
from comparable entertainment contracts going forward, since
“similar events would be placed in private arenas where broadcast
coverage could be more effectively restricted.”139
3. Justice v. National Collegiate Athletic Association: College
Football
In Justice v. National Collegiate Athletic Association,140
student athletes on the University of Arizona varsity football team
filed an application for injunctive relief against the National
Collegiate Athletic Association to prevent enforcement of the
NCAA’s sanctions which rendered their football team ineligible to
attention that would be focused on the World Figure Skating Championships,
observing that, “First Amendment guarantees do not fluctuate in response to the
whims of public approval. The relative popularity of the particular speech at
issue is not a factor in assessing first amendment protection.” Id. at 87.
135
Id. at 86.
136
Post, 510 F. Supp. at 86.
137
Id.
138
Id.
139
Id.
140
577 F. Supp. 356 (D. Ariz. 1983).
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participate in post-season competition or to play in a game
broadcast on national television for two years. Amongst their
claims, the athletes alleged that the sanctions functioned as an
“unconstitutional prior restraint of their First Amendment right to
freedom of expression.”141
The court’s sole charge in that case was to ensure that the
sanctions imposed by the NCAA were neither arbitrary nor
irrational. The Justice court was not permitted to “evaluate the
relative efficacy of the particular means chosen by the NCAA to
achieve its objectives.”142 Since the plaintiffs had violated clearly
defined rules that had clearly delineated consequences, and were
punished accordingly, the NCAA’s actions were neither arbitrary
nor capricious. A holding to the contrary would have subverted the
NCAA’s role as a voluntary athletic association.143
As in Post Newsweek, the court was asked to recognize
conduct as capable of being categorized as First Amendment
speech. The court in Justice, was “unwilling” to grant the plaintiff
athletes relief from the NCAA’s authority.144 Allowing the
plaintiffs to invoke the First Amendment to avoid the NCAA
sanctions would have undermined the NCAA’s disciplinary and
rulemaking authority.145 The plaintiffs in Justice had a lot to lose
141
142

Id. at 373.
Id. at 372 (citing Shelton v. NCAA, 539 F.2d 1197, 1198 (9th Cir.

1976)).
143

Id.
The Justice court uses the term “unwilling” as opposed to using
“unable.” 577 F. Supp. at 374. The former would denote reluctance to exploit a
possibility, while the latter would denote impotence do so, regardless of one’s
desire. MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S DESK DICTIONARY 2, 634 (1995) (defining “able”
as “having sufficient power, skill, or resources to accomplish an object” and
defining “willing” as “inclined or favorably disposed in mind”).
145
The Justice court described such authority during the pendency of that
litigation:
The NCAA is an unincorporated association that regulates a
substantial part of the nation’s intercollegiate athletics. It is composed
of approximately 960 four-year colleges and universities located
throughout the United States. Approximately fifty percent of its
members are private institutions and fifty percent are funded by the
federal or state governments. The policies of the NCAA are established
144
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but the court was unwilling to use the First Amendment to tip the
balance of the equities involved. The penalties exacted upon the
University of Arizona would likely cause substantial hardship on
its football program’s ability to recruit going forward, and would
also deprive the university of any revenues that would have been
realized as a result of any television appearances that would have
been made but for the punishment.
With respect to challenging the NCAA sanctions on First
Amendment grounds, the above “arbitrary and capricious”
standard seems to only have required the Justice court to have had
some sort of plausible basis for concluding that the conduct in
question, football, was not First Amendment speech. Therefore the
court was in effect charged with deciding whether football was
rationally capable of being characterized as mere conduct, as
opposed to speech.146 “In its most basic form,” the Justice court
observed, “athletic competition does not constitute pure speech;
by its member universities and colleges at annual conventions and are
carried out by the NCAA Council. The Council is composed of 46
persons who are elected by the membership at the annual conventions.
1983-84 NCAA Manual, NCAA Constitution, Article 5, Section 1. The
University of Arizona is a public institution and at all pertinent times
has been a member of the NCAA . . . The NCAA publishes annually a
manual which contains the NCAA constitution, bylaws, executive
regulations, enforcement procedures, recommended policies, and rules
of order. The NCAA constitution states in Article 2, Section 2, that “[a]
basic purpose of the Association is to maintain intercollegiate athletics
as an integral part of the educational program and the athlete as an
integral part of the student body and, by so doing, retain a clear line of
demarcation between college athletics and professional sports.” The
constitution also sets forth certain principles for the conduct of
intercollegiate athletics.
Id. at 361.
146
The court’s exact holding was “plaintiffs’ argument that the players
have been denied a constitutional right to expression through football is
unfounded,” Id. at 374. This language would seem at first blush to suggest that
football is not capable of falling under the ambit of the First Amendment.
However, when read in light of an “arbitrary and capricious” standard, it is
better read as saying that it was not entirely irrational for a court to find that the
NCAA’s sanctions did not deny the players a constitutional right to expression
through football.
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rather, participation in athletic competition constitutes physical
activity or conduct.”147 Application of the Spence test led the court
to conclude that “[i]ntercollegiate football, like other sports, is
primarily a conduct-oriented activity, and as such it does not
warrant ‘the same First Amendment protection that other more
‘communicative’ forms of entertainment have been afforded.’”148
4. Sunset Amusement Co. v. Bd. of Police Commissioners of the
City of Los Angeles: Roller Skating
In Sunset Amusement Co. v. Bd. of Police Commissioners of
the City of Los Angeles,149 the Supreme Court of California held
that operating a recreational roller skating rink was not speech
protected by the First Amendment.150 In Sunset Amusement, the
owners of the Rollerbowl roller skating rink challenged the Board
of Police Commissioners of the City of Los Angeles’s denial of a
renewal permit to operate their rink for two consecutive years.151
The operators asserted that the denial of the permit infringed upon
their First Amendment rights because such denial prevented them
from “amusing” and “entertaining” their patrons.152
In a decision that predated Spence v. Washington, the court
observed that “no case has ever held or suggested that simple
physical activity falls within the ambit of the First Amendment, at
least in the absence of some element of communicating or
147

Id.
Id. The athletes in Justice also alleged that “the NCAA sanctions
den[ied] the public at large its right to entertainment. . . .” Id. at 374. The United
States District Court for the District of Arizona observed that under Young v.
American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50 (1976), “a litigant is not permitted to
assert the rights of third parties unless the regulation at issue constitutes a ‘real
and substantial’ deterrent to legitimate expression.” Id. at 374-75 (citing Young,
427 U.S. at 60). The court’s determination that playing college football was not
a “protectable, legitimate form of expression,” thus precluded the plaintiffs from
demonstrating that the NCAA sanctions “constituted a ‘real and substantial’
deterrent to freedom of expression.” Id. at 375.
149
101 Cal. Rptr. 768 (1972).
150
101 Cal. Rptr. 773-74.
151
Id. at 770-71.
152
Id.
148
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advancing ideas or beliefs.”153 The court did look for
communicative elements in rollerskating, seeking some nexus
between the speaker and potential listeners, as would be the case
between a performer and his audience.154 Although the court found
that some rink spectators might be “entertained or amused” by
skaters’ activities, since patrons primarily used the facilities for
“physical exercise and personal pleasure,” the element of
communication between an artist or performer and his audience
“[was] entirely lacking.”155 The Sunset court found that physical
activity standing alone was insufficient to constitute
communication.156 To fall within the protection of the First
Amendment, the court held, a speaker must purposefully engage in
conduct aimed at “communicating or advancing ideas or
beliefs.”157 As the Spence test would subsequently mandate, the
court looked not to whether the skaters’ actions may have
conveyed any number of messages to onlookers, but to whether
that was the purpose of skating.158
The decision in Sunset Amusement is analogous to later First
Amendment jurisprudence invoking the “secondary effects
doctrine,” applied to zoning ordinances affecting adult movie
theaters.159 Jurisprudence aside, the court decided not to renew
Rollerbowl’s permit because it presented a substantial public safety
risk.160 There was substantial evidence at trial that Rollerbowl had
violated “applicable Los Angeles ordinances requiring the
153

Id.
Id.
155
Sunset Amusement, 101 Cal. Rptr. at 774.
156
Id. at 773.
157
Id. at 774.
158
The Sunset Amusement case was decided two years before the Supreme
Court promulgated the Spence test. Had this case been decided under Spence,
the court would have reached the same result, as the first element of the Spence
test is subjective intent to communicate.
159
See City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 47 (1986)
(upholding a city ordinance which imposed a moratorium on licensing adult
movie theaters because the ordinance was “aimed not at the content of the films
shown at “adult motion picture theatres,” but rather at the secondary effects of
such theaters on the surrounding community.”).
160
Id. at 77.
154
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maintenance of off-street parking” and that the parking facilities
that it did provide “were too inadequate to comport with the
‘peace, health, safety, convenience . . . and general welfare of the
public.’”161
Instead of signifying the blanket proposition that sports in
general are not First Amendment speech, Sunset Amusement
simply demonstrates that a court will not recognize a sport as
speech where doing so under the facts and circumstances of that
particular case will endanger the “peace, health, safety,
convenience . . . and general welfare of the public.”162
5. MacDonald v. Newsome: Surfing
In MacDonald v. Newsome, the United States District Court for
the Eastern District of North Carolina applied a similar rationale to
find that recreational surfing was not expressive conduct under the
First Amendment.163 In that case, a surfing enthusiast brought First
Amendment challenge to a county ordinance prohibiting
surfboarding in specified coastal waters. As in Sunset Amusement,
the MacDonald court focused on the plaintiff’s lack of intent to
communicate. The court held that as one surfs along the prohibited
coastal area he neither “protects [the coast] or endeavors to make a
public declaration or statement.”164 Unlike protesters sleeping in a
public park overnight in an effort to further public protest,165 or
wearing an arm band at a public school to protest the Vietnam
War,166 “surfing is more of an avocation or sport,” and as such
does not warrant First Amendment protection.167
161
162
163
164
165
166

Id. at 77-78.
Id.
437 F. Supp. 796 (E.D.N.C. 1977).
437 F. Supp. at 798.
See United States v. Abney, 534 F.2d 984 (D.D.C. 1976).
See Tinker v. Des Moines School District, 393 U.S. 503, 89 S. Ct. 733

(1969).
167

MacDonald, 437 F. Supp. at 797-98. The irony in the MacDonald
court’s holding is that most top surfing competitions include an unscored
component “expression session” where the surfers are out on the water solely to
have fun and express themselves through their surfing.
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Similar also to Sunset Amusement, what swayed the court in
MacDonald was its concern for public safety:
[P]art of the attraction of surfing is the speed the surfer
achieves when maneuvering his board across the face of a
wave. Given the fact that bathers and surfers tend to
congregate in the same area, the speed the surfer reaches
coupled with the unpredictability of ocean waves, poses a
risk of injury to both surfers and swimmers. Furthermore, it
is conceivable that when a surfer stations himself near a
pier waiting for a wave or when riding a wave in that
direction, he may be struck by an errant fishing lure cast by
an angler standing on a pier.168
Thus, MacDonald reinforces the proposition that a court will not
grant full First Amendment protection to a sport where doing so
would jeopardize public safety. This is consistent with both the
“secondary effects doctrine,”169 as well as the Supreme Court’s
recognition of “the outer perimeters of the First Amendment.”170
B. Boxing as First Amendment Protected Expression
There are only two boxing cases involving the application of
the First Amendment, and the decisions in those cases have
differing results. In the first case, United States Satellite
Broadcasting Co. v. Lynch,171 the United States District Court for
the Eastern District of California suggested that any participant in
168

Id. at 800.
See City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 47 (1986)
(upholding a city ordinance which imposed a moratorium on licensing adult
movie theaters because the ordinance was “aimed not at the content of the films
shown at “adult motion picture theatres,” but rather at the secondary effects of
such theaters on the surrounding community”).
170
Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 565-66 (1991). As stated in
one of the cases discussed below, “exposition of an athletic exercise is on the
periphery of protected speech (for the purposes of a balancing of conflicting
interests), as opposed, for example, to political speech, which is the core of the
First Amendment protection.” Post Newsweek Stations-Connecticut, v.
Travelers Ins. Co., 510 F. Supp. 81 (D. Conn. 1981).
171
41 F. Supp. 2d 1113 (E.D. Cal.1999) (any participant in the broadcast or
promotion of a boxing event is a speaker for First Amendment purposes).
169
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the broadcast or promotion of a boxing event is a speaker for First
Amendment purposes.172 Similar to Top Rank, the plaintiff in U.S.
Satellite brought suit seeking a declaration that the California
Boxing Act, which levied a 5% tax on receipts from pay-per-view
boxing and wrestling, was unconstitutional.173 The U.S. Satellite
court ultimately struck down the California Boxing Act because of
the Act’s disparate treatment of combat sports vis-à-vis other payper-view telecasts.174 Although the court rested its holding on the
fact that that the speaker in that case was a broadcaster and that the
speech being taxed was a television broadcast, the court noted in
dicta that First Amendment protection also attaches to boxing
matches.175
Chief Judge Shubb stated, “defendants have not convinced the
court that First Amendment protection does not attach to a live
boxing match organized, held, and televised for the purpose of
entertaining live and remote viewers.”176 The court emphasized
that the First Amendment protects live entertainment, as well as
political and ideological speech.177 Thus, “a general law that
172

Id. at 1120-21.
CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 18600 et seq. (2004). The California Boxing
Act provided that:
Every person who charges and receives a fee for exhibiting a
simultaneous telecast of any live, current, or spontaneous contest or
wrestling exhibition on a closed-circuit telecast viewed within this state
shall . . . pay to the commission a 5 percent tax, exclusive of federal
taxes thereon, of the amount paid for admission or subscription telecast,
as defined in Section 18830, to the showing or viewing of the contest or
wrestling exhibition.
CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 18832.
174
41 F. Supp. 2d at 1120-22.
175
Id. at 1120-21. The court stated:
As a threshold matter, defendants have not convinced the court that
First Amendment protection does not attach to a live boxing match
organized, held, and televised for the purpose of entertaining live and
remote viewers. The First Amendment protects entertainment. It
protects live entertainment, including even the expressive content of
nude dancing.
Id. at 1120 (internal citations omitted).
176
Id. at 1120.
177
Id.
173
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impacts conduct with expressive and non-expressive elements
must be ‘within the constitutional power of the government,’ and
in furtherance of ‘an important or substantial governmental interest
[that] is unrelated to the suppression of free expression.’”178
Yet singling out a boxing telecast for disparate tax treatment is
not the “application of a general law, such as a ban on public
nudity, on the burning of draft cards, or on physical combat, to
conduct with both expressive and non-expressive elements.”179
Instead, since First Amendment protection attaches to the
dissemination of live entertainment, the court found that the tax
would impermissibly regulate expressive conduct.180 The court,
however, declined to formally address whether the sport of boxing
itself could garner First Amendment protection.181 Therefore, if the
plaintiff had not been a broadcaster, it is unclear whether the U.S.
Satellite court would have reached the same conclusion. Further,
even if it did, the question would still remain as to whether tax was
178

Id. (quoting United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968)). O’Brien
involved a challenge to a statute prohibiting the “knowing destruction” of one’s
draft card. In that case, defendant was convicted for publicly burning his draft
card in protest of the Vietnam War. Although defendant’s actions qualified as
speech under the First Amendment, The Court held that a sufficient
governmental interest justified the conviction because of the government’s
substantial interest in assuring the continuing availability of issued Selective
Service certificates, since the statute condemned only the independent noncommunicative impact of conduct within its reach, and because the noncommunicative impact of defendant’s act frustrated the government’s interest.
Id. at 376-91.
Likewise, in Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., the Court applied the same analysis to
nude dancing. Barnes, 501 U.S. 560. Although nude dancing was expressive
conduct under the First Amendment, the Court held that an Indiana statute
requiring nude dancers to wear pasties and G-strings did not violate the First
Amendment since prevention of public nudity was a sufficiently important
government interest to justify regulating the non-speech element of the
expressive conduct. See Barnes, 501 U.S. 567-72.
179
U.S. Satellite, 41 F. Supp. 2d at 1121.
180
Id. at 1120-21.
181
Id. The court observed, that “it simply does not matter in the instant case
whether the First Amendment protects or even applies to boxing,” since “[a] tax
on the dissemination of entertainment based on content must pass strict scrutiny,
regardless of its subject matter.” Id. at 1121 (internal citation omitted).
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unconstitutional because it was a content-based regulation of either
the boxing match itself, or of the dissemination of live
entertainment.
On the other hand, the District Court for the Southern District
of New York in Fighting Finest, Inc. v. Bratton refused to extend
First Amendment protection to boxing.182 Fighting Finest, Inc.
(FFI) was a nonprofit organization established to organize and
operate an amateur boxing team composed of New York City
police officers.183 Initially, FFI was permitted to post notices of
upcoming events on New York Police Department (NYPD)
premises.184 Subsequently, New York City Police Commissioners
Kelly and Bratton denied FFI this right and instead granted the
same right to another boxing team composed of police officers,
which was affiliated with the Patrolman’s Benevolent Association
(PBA), the New York City police officers’ collective bargaining
agent.185 FFI brought suit against the New York City Police
Commissioner Bratton, alleging that its denial of access to the
NYPD’s internal communication system “[interfered] with [its]
First Amendment right to participate in the social, athletic and
charitable activities of FFI, all of which, they [claimed, were]
forms of expressive speech.”186
The court in that case rejected the argument that New York
City police officers’ participation in the sport of amateur boxing
subjectively and objectively conveys “the particularized
message . . . that police officers are individuals of character
pursuing excellence and adhering to ethical standards of fair play
and sportsmanship.”187 The court purported to base its decision on
the notion that taken to its logical conclusion, “[a] limitless variety
of conduct can be labeled ‘speech’ whenever the person engaging
in the conduct intends thereby to express an idea.”188 Applying the
182

898 F. Supp. 192, 195-98 (S.D.N.Y. 1995).
Id. at 193.
184
Id. at 194.
185
Id.
186
Id. at 195.
187
Id. (internal citations omitted).
188
Fighting Finest, Inc. v. Bratton, 898 F. Supp. 192, 195 (S.D.N.Y. 1995)
(internal citations omitted).
183
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Spence test, the court held that although dance, when combined
with nudity, can “inexorably convey a message of eroticism,”189 a
boxing match in which police officers participate “inexorably
conveys any message other than that police officers can be
pugilists.”190
Despite this observation, the court did not reason that this
message does not warrant First Amendment protection.191 The
court did not differentiate between nude dancing and police
participation in amateur boxing or justify why a message of
eroticism is protected but not a message of pugilism.
As in other cases considering sports, the Fighting Finest court
looked beyond the original two prongs of the Spence test in
reaching its conclusion. The subtext of FFI’s complaint was that
Commissioners Kelly and Bratton “sought to curry favor with [the
PBA’s financial secretary] . . . and withdrew recognition and
support from FFI in an order to maintain good labor relations.”192
Observing that such politicking was “hardly pure or pristine,” the
court found that it was nonetheless rational.193
As collective bargaining agent of New York City police
officers, the PBA is an entity that is “integral to the smooth
running of the NYPD.”194 As such, the court found that Bratton’s
and Kelly’s efforts on behalf of the NYPD to maintain good
relations with the PBA were neither irrational nor unreasonable,
“even if they [did] entail acceding to the arguably inappropriate
desire of a PBA official to have a police boxing team of his

189

Id. (citing Barnes, 501 U.S. at 565-66).
Id.
191
Id. at 195-96. Indeed, without any further justification, the court
conclusorily stated, “[w]hile we recognize that dance, when combined with
nudity, can inexorably convey a message of eroticism, we are not convinced that
a boxing match, in which police officers participate, inexorably conveys any
message other than that police officers can be pugilists.” Id. (citations omitted).
Thus, the court held that the plaintiffs had failed to state a First Amendment
claim relative to their boxing activity. Id at 196.
192
Fighting Finest, Inc. v. Bratton, 898 F. Supp. 192, 195-96 (S.D.N.Y.
1995).
193
Id.
194
Id. at 195.
190
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own.”195 Since PBA plays a crucial role in the NYPD’s official
business, excluding FFI from the internal communication system
served the official interests of both the PBA and the NYPD. The
court averred that “this fact [was] enough . . . to justify giving the
PBA preferential access to the non-public forum at issue.”196
Within the forum-analysis framework, several factors opposed
the police officers’ interest in expressing themselves through the
sport of boxing. First, FFI did not allege any burden on the
officers’ boxing activity which would violate the First
Amendment.197 Second, FFI did not allege facts sufficient to
indicate that the NYPD’s internal communication system was
designated “as a place for expressive activity by the public at
large.”198 Third, FFI did not allege any fact indicating Kelly and
Bratton denied access to the internal communications system based
on any viewpoint advocated by FFI.199
In sum, these cases do not stand for the proposition that boxing
is incapable of protection under the First Amendment. Instead, in
each case, there was an overriding policy concern that prevented
the court from finding that the sport in question falls under the
ambit of the First Amendment.
III. BOXING AS EXPRESSIVE CONDUCT
Contrary to Judge Wolf’s notion in Top Rank, boxers
communicate more than their desire to win prize money.200 With
each fight, a boxer must prove that he is the superior fighter. The
boxer intends to demonstrate this to himself and others who may
be watching, by his participation in the fight. When a fighter scores
a knockout or wins on the cards, he has demonstrated to spectators,

195

Id. at 195-96. As an aside, the court noted that had such desire stemmed
from a reason “that was unconstitutional in and of itself, [e.g.], a desire to form
an all-white team” would entail a different result. Id.
196
Id. at 197-98.
197
Id. at 195.
198
Id. at 197.
199
Id.
200
See Top Rank, 837 So. 2d 496 at 500-02.
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or at least a panel of judges,201 that he is the better fighter. Indeed,
one of the most appealing aspects of boxing is that, as a fight, it is
easily understood by spectators, regardless of their level of
understanding of the sport. But the sport of boxing communicates
more that just pugilistic prowess. Whether viewed merely as a
legalized fight or something more, an analysis of the conduct
shows that if nude dancing can warrant First Amendment
protection as expressive conduct, so too should boxing.
A. Boxing Conveys a Message
The Supreme Court has held that fighting is not speech.202
However the sport of boxing removes harmful elements from
fighting while preserving its status as a form of expressive
combat.203 While there has been no Supreme Court decision
addressing the communicative aspects of boxing, the issue of
whether the expression of hatred through violence can be punished
separately from the violence itself was considered in Wisconsin v.
Mitchell.204 The Supreme Court has held that violence that
produces special harms distinct from their communicative impact
are entitled to no constitutional protection.205 However, in
Mitchell, the Court left open the possibility that in the absence of
“special harms” that remove conduct from First Amendment
201

Either of which would be “those receiving the message” in First
Amendment parlance.
202
“[A] physical assault is not by any stretch of the imagination expressive
conduct protected by the First Amendment.” Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 508 U.S.
476, 484 (1993) (citing Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 628
(1984) (“[V]iolence or other types of potentially expressive activities that
produce special harms distinct from their communicative impact . . . are entitled
to no constitutional protection”) and NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458
U.S. 886, 916 (1982) (“The First Amendment does not protect violence”)).
203
NED BEAUMONT, CHAMPIONSHIP STREETFIGHTING: BOXING AS A
MARTIAL ART 8-9 (1997). In other words, boxing is legal, but the safeguards
present in a boxing match do not detract from its categorization as a form of
combat able to express its particular message via violence.
204
Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 508 U.S. 476 (1993). See also Barclay v. Florida,
463 U.S. 939 (1983).
205
Wisconsin, 508 U.S. at 487.
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protections, physical violence may be expressive speech.206
1. Nude Dancing as Speech: A Comparison to Boxing
Boxing matches are fighting demonstrations, thus they have
expressive qualities similar to erotic performances which have
garnered First Amendment protection from the Supreme Court.207
The Supreme Court first indicated that nude dancing was protected
under the First Amendment in Schad v. Borough of Mt.
Ephraim.208 But the Supreme Court added a slight modification to
Schad in Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc. 209 In that case, the Court
ruled that Indiana’s public-indecency law totally preventing nude
dancing did not violate the First Amendment.210 The Court held
that a state may regulate nude dancing so long as the law: (i) is
clearly within the constitutional power of the state; (ii) furthers
substantial governmental interests; (iii) is unrelated to the
suppression of free expression; and (iv) restriction in the statute is
narrowly tailored.211
Indiana’s public-indecency statute made it a misdemeanor to
appear nude in a public place, and it effectively required female
dancers to wear at least “pasties” and a “G-string” while
dancing.212 Two “gentlemen’s clubs” in South Bend, Indiana
wishing to provide all-nude dancing as entertainment, Glen
Theatre, Inc. and the Kitty Kat Lounge, sued in an Indiana federal
district court to enjoin the enforcement of Indiana’s public206

Id. at 487 (“Whereas the ordinance struck down in R.A.V. was explicitly
directed at expression (i.e., ‘speech’ or ‘messages’), the statute in this case is
aimed at conduct unprotected by the First Amendment.”).
207
See Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560 (1991), rev’g 904 F.2d
1081 (1990), rev’g 726 F. Supp. 728 (1985); Schad v. Borough of Mt. Ephraim,
452 U.S. 61 (1981).
208
452 U.S. 61 (1981). In Schad, the Court struck down a city ordinance
prohibiting all live entertainment which was used to shut down a nude dancing
establishment. The Court noted, “nude dancing is not without its First
Amendment protections from official regulation.” Id. at 66.
209
Barnes, 501 U.S. 560.
210
Id.
211
Barnes, 501 U.S. at 567.
212
Id. at 563.
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indecency statute. The plaintiffs claimed that Indiana’s prohibition
of nudity in public places violated the First Amendment.213
As a threshold matter, the plurality noted that “nude dancing of
the kind sought to be performed here is expressive conduct within
the outer perimeters of the First Amendment, though we view it as
only marginally so.”214 But the Court also observed that the public
indecency statute was content-neutral: Indiana has not banned nude
dancing as such but has proscribed public nudity across the
board.215 As such, it was subject to intermediate scrutiny.216
Although nude dancing was symbolic speech, the Court noted
that it was not entitled to full First Amendment protection:
[w]hen “speech” and “nonspeech” elements are combined
in the same course of conduct, a sufficiently important
governmental interest in regulating the nonspeech element
can justify incidental limitations on First Amendment
freedoms.217
Consequently, the Court applied the four-part test for regulating
symbolic speech promulgated under United States v. O’Brien,
which determined that government regulation of symbolic speech
is adequately justified:
[i]f it is within the constitutional power of the Government;
if it furthers an important or substantial governmental
interest; if the governmental interest is unrelated to the
suppression of free expression; and if the incidental
restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms is no
greater than is essential to the furtherance of that interest.218
Under the O’Brien test, the Court found Indiana’s publicindecency statute was justified, in spite of its limitations on an
expressive activity. First, the statute was clearly within the

213

Id. at 562-64.
Id. at 566.
215
Id. This is in contrast to Florida’s boxing tax, which is content-based,
since it regulates only pay-per-view boxing programming, as opposed to payper-view programming across the board.
216
Barnes, 501 U.S. at 567.
217
Id. (quoting United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376-77 (1968)).
218
Id.
214
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constitutional power of the state.219 Second, the statute served the
purpose of “protecting societal order and morality.”220 Third, the
statute was not directed at the message conveyed by nude dancing,
but instead reflects public morality; the Court observed, “[t]he
perceived evil that Indiana seeks to address is not erotic dancing,
but public nudity.”221 Finally, the Court opined that requiring
dancers to don pasties and G-strings did not deprive nude dancing
of its erotic message, but merely made the message “slightly less
graphic.”222
In his concurring opinion, Justice Scalia argued that Indiana’s
public-indecency law should be upheld because it is a “general law
regulating conduct and not specifically directed at expression.”223
Rather than be held “to some lower level of First Amendment
scrutiny,” the statute was constitutional because “moral opposition
to nudity supplied a rational basis for its prohibition.”224 Justice
Souter also concurred in the judgment, emphasizing the secondary
effects of nude dancing:
Legislation seeking to combat the secondary effects of
adult entertainment need not await localized proof of those
effects, [and] the State of Indiana could reasonably
conclude that forbidding nude entertainment of the type
offered at the Kitty Kat Lounge and the Glen Theatre
[furthers] its interest in preventing prostitution, sexual
assault, and associated crimes.225
Note the statute at issue in Barnes is not analogous to the
Florida statute at issue in Top Rank.226 Since the Indiana statute is
not directed at any conduct in particular, it is subject to
intermediate scrutiny under O’Brien. However, as discussed
throughout this piece, Florida’s Kershaw Act singles out boxing
from all other forms of pay-per-view programming and is therefore
219

Id.
Id. at 568.
221
Id. at 571.
222
Id.
223
Id. at 572.
224
Id. at 580.
225
Barnes, 501 U.S. at 584.
226
See supra note 215.
220
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subject to strict scrutiny. Thus, there would be no O’Brien
analysis. Further, unlike the case with Indiana, Florida did not
enact the Kershaw Act to combat any invidious secondary effects
of boxing; it is merely a means of raising revenue. As such, the
Kershaw Act would not meet intermediate scrutiny even if we
were to assume arguendo that intermediate scrutiny was applicable
to Florida’s taxation statute.
2. Boxing’s Message
Similar to an erotic dancer, a boxer speaks with his “command
of the body.”227 Through a combination of power and ring
generalship, boxers engage in a dialogue that “[goes] deep into the
heart of each other’s matter, [as if] they are [conversing] with their
physiques.”228 In effect, fighters communicate amongst themselves
and with their audiences as plainly if they were putting the
“subtleties of their states in words,” yet they accomplish this end
entirely using their bodies.229 In On Boxing, Joyce Carol Oates
227

Mailer, supra note 13, at 124.
Id. at 124-25.
229
In King of the Hill, Norman Mailer commented on the how the personal,
intimate nature of the boxing, combined with the struggle it depicts, makes
boxing a form of communication in itself:
There are languages other than words, languages of symbol and
languages of nature. There are languages of the body. And
prizefighting is one of them. There is no attempting to comprehend
a prizefighter unless we are willing to recognize that he speaks with
a command of the body which is a detached, subtle, and
comprehensive in its intelligence as any exercise of mind by such
social engineers as Herman Kahn or Henry Kissinger. . . . so many a
good average prizefighter, just a little punchy, does not speak with
any particular éclat. That doesn’t mean he is incapable of expressing
himself with wit, style, and an aesthetic flair for surprise when he
boxes wit his body, any more than Kahn’s obesity would keep us
from recognizing that his mind can work with strength. Boxing is a
dialogue between bodies. Ignorant men, usually black, and usually
next to illiterate, address one another in a set of conversational
exchanges which go deep into the heart of each other’s matter. It is
just that they converse with their physiques. . . Boxing is a rapid
debate between two sets of intelligence. It takes place rapidly
228
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characterized boxing as a story without words, and observed that a
fight is a pure art form rather than a sport.230 Thus, if boxing is the
message, then the boxing match is the medium. Boxers are akin to
characters in a play.231 Once the bell rings, the plot unfolds and the
characters begin to interact in 3 minute scenes. The dialogue
continues until the climax, where one fighter emerges the better
man.232
because it is conducted with the body rather than the mind. . .
[Boxers] speak to each other with their bodies, they signal with their
clothes. They talk with many a silent telepathic intelligence. And
doubtless feel the frustration of being unable to express the
subtleties of their states in words, just as the average middle-class
white will feel unable to carry out dreams of glory by the uses of his
body.
Id.
230

Oates, supra note 1, at 11. Oates explained:
Because a boxing match is a story without words, this doesn’t
mean that it has no text or no language, that it is somehow “brute,”
“primitive,” “inarticulate,” only that the text is improvised in action;
the language a dialogue between the boxers of a most refined sort
(one might say, as much neurological as psychological: a dialogue
of split-second reflexes) in a joint response to the mysterious will of
the audience which is always that the fight be a worthy one so that
the crude paraphernalia of the setting—ring, lights, ropes, stained
canvas, the staring onlookers themselves—be erased, forgotten. . .
Ringside announcers give to the wordless spectacles a narrative
unity, yet boxing as performance is more clearly akin to dance or
music than narrative.
231
Id. at 9.
232
Michael Stephens, Poetics of Boxing, in READING THE FIGHTS, supra
note 13, at 124. Michael Stephens best articulated the analogy:
Aristotle placed plot above character, although as plot is
character, and the reverse, it could also be said that a fighter is the
fight, too. A fighter brings his character to the fight, but that
character can only be defined in terms of the course of its actions in
the ring. The best fights are not Stallone-like pushes and pulls
between good and evil. . . but rather, in the best cases, two rights
colliding, or a right and a left, and so on, until the cumulative effect
of choices unmasks one opponent. In drama it is called the
recognition scene; in boxing it could be called the telling round.
Each fight breaks down into those scenes we call rounds. . . Each
round, like a scene, has its peaks and valleys, its goals, objectives,
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Boxing is not just a violent interaction and has elements
differentiating the sport from common streetfights. An example is
the fighters’ use of gloves. While gloves make a difference in a
fight, contrary to the common misconception, they do not protect
fighters from damage done by their opponent’s punches.233 Indeed,
the 8 to 10 oz. gloves used by professional fighters are too light to
do so.234 Instead, gloves protect the fighters’ fists from damage
done by throwing punches throughout the course of a bout.235 The
boxers’ ability to land punches without hurting their hands
therefore increases the potential duration of the bout without
affecting the damage done to the other fighter.
The division of a boxing match into rounds not only
distinguishes the sport from a common fight, but also serves to
further extend the exposition without impacting the basic message.
Boxing matches are generally divided into up to twelve threeminute rounds.236 Conversely, street fights are of indeterminate
duration. Given the strenuous nature of fighting, a chance to rest
every three minutes allows a boxer to fight longer in the ring than
on the street, therefore increasing the duration of the fight.237
Therefore, whereas G-strings and pasties arguably diminished the
message conveyed by nude dancing, the rules, regulations and
equipment that differentiate boxing from a streetfight serve to
“through lines,” and obstacles, and the result of ineluctable choices
creating the rhythm of that action. . . As drama is physicalized this
way, words, as words becomes actions, boxing speaks to those who
want to listen to it; ideas are given actions. Like drama, something
happens, and most often the players are never the same as a result of
what happens, those various choices; they are changed; they have
been transformed.
Id.
233

BEAUMONT, supra note 203, at 31.
See WORLD BOXING ASSOCIATION, REGULATIONS AND RULES
GOVERNING CHAMPIONSHIP CONTESTS § 10 (2004) [hereinafter WBA RULES].
235
BEAUMONT, supra note 203, at 31-32.
236
E.g., WBA RULES, supra note 247, at § 10.
237
One commentator estimated that the ratio of the duration of a street fight
versus that of a boxing match was 6:1. That is, a street fight will go 30 seconds
for every three minute round a fighter would be able to last in a bout divided
into three minute rounds. BEAUMONT, supra note 203, at 8-9.
234

STEIN MACROED CORRECTED 07-30-06.DOC

PAY-PER-VIEW BOXING TAXATION

7/30/2006 12:36 PM

1039

enhance the message transmitted by boxers.
Finally, civilians generally fight to accomplish either of two
nonexclusive objectives: pain or possession.238 Through a physical
attack on a wrongdoer, a person at once denounces a wrongful act
and restores his own dignity and self-respect.239 The boxer, on the
238

See WALTER J. ONG, FIGHTING FOR LIFE 29 (1981). In Fighting for Life,
Ong asserts that each participant in a contest of hostility “fights to hurt his
enemy.” Id. (emphasis added). Nonetheless, he does not expand on how an
adversary must hurt his enemy. Intuitively, the term “hurt” ought to encompass
not only physical pain, such as that which would accompany a broken nose, but
should also include emotional pain, such as the embarrassment of suffering a
public humiliation.
The Second Defenestration of Prague in 1618 is an example of suffering
emotional pain via public humiliation. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (8th ed.
2004), WESTLAW, BLACKS (defenestration is the “[a]ct of throwing someone
or something out a window”). In retaliation to Holy Roman Emperor Ferdinand
II’s attempts to crush Czech Protestantism, an assembly of Protestants found
several imperial regents guilty of violating the religious-liberty guarantee of
1609 and subsequently defenestrated them from atop the council room of Prague
Castle into a pile of manure below. ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA ONLINE,
Prague,
Defenestration
of
(Oct.
31,
2004),
http://www.britannica.com/ebc/article?tocId=9375796&query=defenestration&c
t=. See also John L. Hoh, Jr., Defenestration of Prague, available at
http://www.suite101.com/article.cfm/lutheranism/99284. None of the regents
was seriously hurt as a result of the fall, but they, and the Holy Roman Empire,
had been publicly humiliated by what they viewed as Protestant Rabble. See
wordiQ.com,
Definition
of
Defenestrations
of
Prague,
http://www.wordiq.com/definition/Defenestrations_of_Prague. In fact, the Holy
Roman Empire was so disgraced by the incident that Ferdinand II was deposed,
thus ushering in the Thirty Years’ War. See, e.g., infoplease.com, Thirty Years
War:
The
Bohemian
Period,
http://www.infoplease.
com/ce6/history/A0861529.html.
In sum, the Holy Roman Empire was “hurt” by the Second Defenestration
because its monarch was deposed and a long and bloody struggle raged
throughout Europe as a result. Yet the incident itself caused little, if any,
physical pain to the defeated adversaries. This illustration proves that physical
pain is a sufficient, but not necessary, condition to “hurt” one’s enemy in a
contest of hostility.
239
There is a similarity between the concept of reprobation in a fisticuffs,
on one hand, and the concept of “public prejudice” in antebellum American
dueling. See C.A. Harwell Wells, The End of the Affair? Anti-Dueling Laws and
Social Norms in Antebellum America, 54 VAND. L. REV. 1805, 1808-11 (2001).

STEIN MACROED CORRECTED 07-30-06.DOC

1040

7/30/2006 12:36 PM

JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY

other hand, aims simultaneously to dominate his opponent and
affirm his identity as a superior fighter. By inflicting pain upon his
opponent this time, a boxer also seeks to dissuade the opponent
from future challenges “in order to avoid further unpleasantness, as
well as, to communicate to others that he will not tolerate similar
challenges.240 A fighter wants to “make an example” out of his
adversary.241 Finally, a boxer may also fight to exert possession
over a trophy or a championship belt. Although this can be viewed
as a contest for possession over an object, it is also symbolic of the
message of self-affirmation—the trophy or belt is the physical
embodiment of the concept “may the best man win”—the belt
holder is the champion of the world, affirming that he is the best
fighter in his weight class.
B. Boxing’s Message is Understood by its Audience
Boxers convey a message that is not only likely to be
understood by their audience, but is in fact understood by their
audience.242 Boxing is like no other sport.243 Indeed, the term

“‘Public prejudice’ demanded that a gentleman either defend his honor in a duel
or else sacrifice the respect of his peers.” Id. at 1809. Indeed, the act of dueling
itself communicated to others “that the duelists were men of honor.” Id. at 1810.
This resembles the expression inherent in a modern street fight: participation
such a fight evinces the participant’s will to defend his honor by fighting to
simultaneously decry his opponent’s malicious acts and reinstate his own selfworth. 1 CHARLES E. TORCIA, WHARTON’S CRIMINAL LAW § 2 (15th ed. Supp.
Nov. 2003), WESTLAW, CRIMLAW at 2 [hereinafter WHARTON].
240
See WHARTON, supra note 252, at 3.
241
See id.
242
See e.g., Robert W. Enzenauer & Patrick J. Kelly, The Borrowed
Imagery of Boxing, 264 JAMA 1531 (1990). In The Borrowed Imagery of
Boxing, the authors discuss the use of boxing imagery in Pfizer’s promotion of
their antibiotic Cefobid. Id. Pfizer touted Cefobid as “the infection fighter that
defeats nosocomial pneumonia and knocks out infections.” Id. To illustrate the
slogan, a series of ads pictured a boxer’s hands raised in victory, a pair of
boxing gloves, or a pair of boxing trunks. Id. Pfizer stated that they used the
borrowed imagery of boxing as a way to communicate graphically “the image of
strength and power, and the ability to triumph over infections.” Id.
243
See generally Oates, supra note 1, at 8-11.
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“sport” does not do justice to categorizing the “Sweet Science.”244
At once, it is an amorphous conglomeration of art, drama and sport
packaged in three-minute increments. It defies neat categorization.
As Joyce Carol Oates remarked in her seminal work, On Boxing,
about boxing’s impact on her:
Nor can I think of boxing in writerly terms as a
metaphor for something else. No one . . . is likely to think
of boxing as a symbol of something beyond itself, as if its
uniqueness were merely an abbreviation, or iconographic;
though I can entertain the proposition that life is a metaphor
for boxing—for one of those bouts that go on and on, round
following round, jabs, missed punches, clinches, nothing
determined, again the bell and again you and your opponent
so evenly matched it’s impossible not to see that your
opponent is you: and why this struggle on an elevated
platform enclosed by ropes as in a pen beneath hot crude
pitiless lights in the presence of an impatient crowd?—that
sort of hellish-writerly metaphor. Life is like boxing in
many unsettling respects. But boxing is only like boxing.245
At the most rudimentary level, boxing is a fight sanctioned by
the state that pits two fighters together in a struggle.246 The goal is
simple: defeat your opponent.247 The message sent in doing so is
244

The phrase “sweet science of boxing” (commonly shortened to “sweet
science”) was popularized by A.J. Liebling, a literary journalist and the author
of a collection of articles in the 1950s entitled The Sweet Science. Liebling
borrowed the expression from Pierce Egan, who in the 1700s wrote a collection
of boxing articles entitled Boxiana. See Jon Christensen, The Sweet Science of
Stories, available at http://www.greatbasinweb.com/gb2-2/sweetstories.htm
(1997).
245
Oates, supra note 1, at 4 (emphasis in original).
246
That is, sanctioned by the state. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 548.008, supra
note 12.
Considered in the abstract the boxing ring is an altar of sorts, one
of those legendary spaces where the laws of a nation are suspended:
inside the ropes, during an officially regulated three-minute round, a
man may be killed at his opponent’s hands but he cannot legally be
murdered.
Oates, supra note 1, at 19.
247
This can be accomplished either by knocking out your opponent, or
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understood by those who view a match.248 Each boxing match is a
story, “a unique and highly condensed drama without words.”249
Boxers are there to establish themselves in front of the fans, their
trainers, and the world250 in “a public accounting of the outermost
limits of their beings.”251 Boxers communicate “what physical and
psychic power they possess—of how much or how little they are
capable.”252 The objective message received by the audience is
readily apparent: “‘the Sweet Science of Bruising’ celebrates the
physicality of men, even as it dramatizes the limitations,
sometimes tragic, more often poignant, of the physical.”253 Oates
observed, “To enter the ring near-naked and to risk one’s life is to
make of one’s audience voyeurs of a kind: boxing is so
intimate.”254
Expressing oneself to society through boxing is not a novel
endeavor. As far back as Ancient Greece, boxers were viewed as
heroes much in the same vain as Heracles and Ajax.255 Combat
sports champions256 received heroes’ honors, and were more
outscoring him on the judges’ scorecards. See WBA RULES § § 1, 3 (delineating
ways in which a boxer can win a fight).
248
Indeed, there is more expressed than simply the desire to win prize
money. For example, amateur bouts, which can be some of the most ferocious
confrontations, often have no fight purse. If the message communicated by
participants in the sport of boxing is one of greed, as asserted by the Top Rank
court, how would they categorize the message in these prizeless prizefights?
249
Oates, supra note 1, at 8.
250
This is especially true in the case of global telecasts. But needless to
say, boxing is a truly global sport, hence why the top prize is “champion of the
world.” Fighters come from, and compete, all around the world (e.g., Mike
Tyson (U.S.A.), Lennox Lewis (U.K.), Vitali Klitschko (Germany via
Kazakhstan), Roberto Duran (Panama), Hector “Macho” Camacho (Mexico),
David Tua (New Zealand), Ben Tackie (Ghana), Yoshihiro Irei (Japan)). As a
result, even in the early days of their careers, boxers compete in a global arena
and try to make a name for themselves in the eyes of the world.
251
Oates, supra note 1, at 8.
252
Id.
253
Id.
254
Id. at 7.
255
See COMBAT SPORTS IN THE ANCIENT WORLD at 128-29. supra note 11
256
E.g., boxing, wrestling and pankration (a Greek sport combining boxing,
kicking, wrestling throws, strangle holds and pressure locks). See id. at 54.
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revered than even soldiers who had fallen in battle.257 Fighters
distinguished themselves as individual champions, much in the
way that Homer’s great warriors had sought out and defeated
suitable opponents for themselves in the melees of the Iliad.258
These champions brought “delight and honor” to their city-states,
and were viewed as public benefactors, a reflection of the high
esteem and regard held for boxing.259 Like his counterpart in
Ancient Greece, a modern boxer strives to be seen by his audience
“not only to be a champion but to be a great champion—an
immortal.”260
Despite the passage of millennia since boxing’s inception, the
status of the modern boxer-hero persists.261 Regarding the modern
applicability of the Hellenic hero-athlete, Nietzsche remarked,
“[e]very talent must unfold itself in fighting.”262 But prowess in the
ring garners more than mere recognition as a role model or talented
athlete for the modern boxer. There is still a link between the
fighter and his audience, similar to that between the ancient
pugilist and his audience.263 His performance in the ring
communicates to the audience who he is as a person and where he
stands in society.264 Like his Greco-Roman counterpart, a boxer’s
feats of pugilism serve to immortalize him in the eyes of
spectators.265
However, boxing’s message is not confined to the concept of
status. Especially in the twentieth century, boxing was a vehicle of
257

Id. at 128.
Id. at 113.
259
Id. at 128.
260
Oates, supra note 1, at 6.
261
Anthony J. Cortese, The Notre Dame Bengal Bouts: Symbolic
Immortality Through Sport, 8/1/97 J. SPORT BEHAV. 347 (1997), available at
1997 WL 12852129 (discussing the role of the modern boxer as a heroimmortal).
262
See Oates, supra note 1, at 9.
263
Cortese, supra note 261, at *4.
264
Id. Cortese noted, “[p]ublics are served by [boxers] and make active
demands on them; they provide role-support (and, occasionally, nonsupport).”
Id.
265
Id.
258
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social communication and change. In 1910, for example, boxing
broke down the color barrier in American professional sports.266 In
that year, Jack Johnson, a black fighter, fought for the heavyweight
title against Jim Jeffries, a white fighter dubbed the “Great White
Hope,” in what was called “a fight for all the racial marbles.”267
Until this point, there had never been a black heavyweight
champion.268 This was largely a function of the remnant of postCivil War racism that labeled blacks as inferior, as well as some
deft maneuvering by those who determined which fighters could
qualify for a shot at the title.269 The fight was advertised as “a
match of civilization and virtue against savagery and baseness.”270
Despite the controversy, and a nation’s collective denial that a
black man could be heavyweight champion, the fight took place as
scheduled in Las Vegas, Nevada.271 Johnson conducted himself
with grace and decorum, responding to the crowd’s numerous
boos, jeers and epithets in a manner that Collier’s described as “the
good sense [and] cleverness to keep the respectful ingratiating
ways of the Southern [black].”272 Likewise, in response to the
racially charged taunts of Jeffries and his corner man, former
heavyweight champ “Gentleman” Jim Corbett, Johnson “politely
responded and smiled.”273
More importantly, Johnson rose above his opponent in terms of
boxing ability.274 Johnson completely dominated Jeffries for fifteen
rounds; he definitively proved himself the better fighter.275 Finally,
266

See generally RANDY ROBERTS, PAPA JACK: JACK JOHNSON AND THE
ERA OF WHITE HOPES 85-107 (1985).
267
Id. at 85-86.
268
Id. at 86-90.
269
Id.
270
Id. at 85. White America was so offended by the prospect of a black
champion that they launched a myriad of protests to stop the fight altogether,
including a letter writing campaign, where the Governor of California received
nearly 1 million postcards imploring, “STOP THE FIGHT, THIS IS THE 20TH
CENTURY.” Id. at 94.
271
Id. at 104.
272
ROBERTS, supra note 266, at 105.
273
Id.
274
Id. at 105-07.
275
Id. Some commentators at the time believed that Johnson was merely
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late in the fifteenth round, Johnson launched a barrage of over
twenty punches to Jeffries’s bloodied and swollen face. Tens
seconds later, Jack Johnson became the first black heavyweight
champion of the world.276 Thus, by breaking the color barrier with
respect to the heavyweight championship, Jack Johnson used
boxing to prove to the world that blacks were not inferior and were
capable athletes. His feats in the ring on that day in 1910 paved the
way for future black athletes to compete on equal ground in
mainstream professional sports. His victory transcended the ring,
as it was a milestone in healing the wounds of slavery and creating
an integrated society in America.277
Boxing was also used to fire America’s first shots against
Nazism during World War II. On June 22, 1938, Joe Louis, a black
American, fought a rematch against Max Schmeling, the German
heavyweight champion of the world, in a bout that pitted the free
world against Nazism.278 At the time of the fight, the Nazi machine
had already begun to engulf Europe into its cloud of fascist
oppression.279 During this dark time, Americans looked to Joe
Louis as their bastion of good, standing against the evil that the
Nazis represented.280
The symbolism of the match was readily apparent in the press
coverage of the fight. Americans believed that doling out a defeat
to Schmeling, an Aryan, at the hands of a black fighter would

toying with Jeffries, and could have ended the fight much earlier, but instead
wanted to humiliate his opponent and make him suffer for his remarks made
before and during the fight. Id. at 105-06.
276
Id.
277
See id. at 13.
278
See generally CHRIS MEAD, CHAMPION JOE LOUIS: BLACK HERO IN
WHITE AMERICA 139-42 (Penguin Sports Library ed. 1986).
279
See id. at 139.
280
Id. at 139-40. Rumors about the actors in the fight evince the sentiment
at the time. For example, there were rumors that Adolf Hitler would make
Schmeling Minister of Sport if he defeated Louis, and that Schmeling said that
no black man could beat a member of the master race. Id. at 139. Another rumor
was that Max Machon, Schmeling’s trainer, had a Nazi uniform in his closet. Id.
Even though these rumors proved to be false, Joe Louis was “led to hate
Schmeling and what the Nazis stood for.” Id.
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disgrace the Nazi propaganda machine.281 In addition to fears that
a Louis defeat would represent a victory for the Nazis, Americans
were also concerned that if a German became champion, Hitler
would effectively steal the title from America for good.282 In sum,
Germans, via Schmeling, represented “one of the worst enemies in
the world,” and Joe Louis was America’s great hope in defeating
the enemy.283
Given the dramatic hype surrounding the bout, the event itself
was almost anticlimactic. Living up to his nickname “the Brown
Bomber,” Louis quickly pummeled Schmeling into submission.284
Schmeling landed only one punch before his corner man Max
Machon threw in the towel to end the fight.285 In the end, Joe
Louis, deemed racially inferior by the Nazis, defeated an “Aryan
superman,” proving to the world that so-called Aryans were not the
superior beings that Nazi propaganda had made them out to be and,
281

Id. at 140. One newswire reported:
German fans leave only one choice for [Schmeling]—a
comeback. His German admirers—and there are millions, from
Reichsfürer Hitler down—hate the thought of defeat. . . .
Newspapers do not say it, but it is tacitly understood that a Louis
victory would be taken [in Germany] as a disgrace from the Nazi
racial viewpoint.

Id.
282

Id. at 140. One reporter feared that Schmeling wanted the title on behalf
of himself and the German nation, and if successful would never again allow an
American to vie for it. Id. Another journalist posited that even if American
preclusion were farfetched, “Nobody with a sense of fairness wants to see the
next heavyweight championship fight staged in the land bossed by Hitler.” Id.
283
Id. at 141. On the eve of the bout, a journalist in New York stated:
Race prejudice should have no place in sports. But Hitler has
created a situation which the civilized world cannot and will not
overlook. In trying to prove that the Germans are supreme in all
things he has made an 18-karat jackass of himself and caused the
Nazis to be despised throughout the world. . . . Using sentiment—
and judgment too—I choose Joe Louis, an American Negro, to beat
the ears off Max.
Id.
284
Bob Considine, The Second Louis-Schmeling Fight, in FIRESIDE BOOK
OF BOXING 83 (W.C. Heinz ed. 1961).
285
Id.
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more importantly, that they could be beaten.
C. Boxing Passes the Spence Test as Conduct that is First
Amendment Speech
History demonstrates that boxing is within the ambit of the
First Amendment, but the Top Rank court overlooked this
historical analysis.286 The Top Rank decision reflects modern
courts’ narrow notion of symbolism, whereby courts accept
conduct as symbolic if it can easily be categorized into concrete
concepts.287 For example, wearing a black armband288 or burning a
draft card289 evinced messages that one is protesting the Vietnam
War. Burning a flag evinced discontent with the Reagan
administration.290
Thus,
physical
conduct
labeled
“communication” can be boiled down by the courts into tangible
words, numbers or symbols, e.g., nude dancing conveys
“eroticism.”291 Although the expression inherent in boxing cannot
be neatly categorized, it is expressive conduct that conveys a
specific message that has a substantial likelihood of being
understood nonetheless.292 A boxer speaks with a language of the
286

Top Rank, 837 So. 2d at 500. The court conclusorily stated that boxers
can only communicate their desire to win prize money.
287
See Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989).
288
Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989); Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc.,
501 U.S. 560; Spence, 418 U.S. 405; United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367
(1968).
289
O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367.
290
Johnson, 491 U.S. 397.
291
Barnes, 501 U.S. 560.
292
Norman Mailer, King of the Hill, in JOYCE CAROL OATES & DANIEL
HALPERN, READING THE FIGHTS 124 (1988). In King of the Hill, Norman Mailer
lamented on this very point:
[T]wo great fighters in a great fight travel down subterranean rivers
of exhaustion and cross mountain peaks of agony, stare at the light of
their own death in the eye of the man they are fighting, travel into the
crossroads of the most excruciating choice of karma as they get up
from the floor against all the appeal of the sweet swooning
catacombs of oblivion—it is just that we do not see them this way,
because they are not primarily men of words, and this is the century
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body that defies words, yet communicates a message.293
Despite court determinations that professional wrestling,294
figure skating,295 recreational surfing,296 recreational roller
skating,297 and college football298 are unworthy of First
Amendment protection, the Spence test calls for a sport-by-sport
analysis. Boxing is distinct from any other sport.299 Unlike football
and other team sports, there is an individual focus in boxing.300
Since each side is represented by only one individual, emphasis is
squarely on the two players fighting for superiority in the “squared
circle.”301 In this way, the more intimate nature of boxing delivers
a more “particularized” message than does a team sport.302
Indeed, individual expression is the core of boxing because
boxers must express their individual role-identity to their
audience.303 “One does not play boxing”;304 as a survival game,
of words, numbers, and symbols. Enough.
Id.
293

Mailer, supra note 13, at 124-25.
Murdock, 361 F. Supp. 1083.
295
Post, 510 F. Supp. 81.
296
MacDonald, 437 F. Supp. 796.
297
Sunset Amusement, 101 Cal. Rptr. 768.
298
Justice, 577 F. Supp. 356.
299
See e.g., Oates, supra note 1, at 20-21.
300
Football and other team sports are better viewed as the collective action
of many individuals. While each athlete doubtless has a back story, and the
teams are playing for a common goal, collective action presents a difficulty in
that it is extremely difficult, if not impossible for many to come together and
convey a particularized message other than the collective desire to score and
win. Further, boxing is a fight—primal instinct, yet a language in itself. Since
time immemorial, fighting has conveyed a message—dominance over territory
or an item, rightful partner to a mate, etc. Thus, team sports lack the expressive
dialogue-like quality inherent in boxing.
301
It is even different than professional wrestling, which is generally a
scripted match, and is more akin to pure entertainment. There is an alternative
argument that due to its substantial pure entertainment component, pro wrestling
should receive First Amendment protection in the way a play or film would.
However, to pursue this argument would go beyond the scope of this note.
302
See e.g., Justice, 577 F. Supp. 356.
303
Regarding the Bengal Bouts at Notre Dame, Cortese observed:
Since [a boxing match is] a public event and because the
294
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boxing expresses an image of humanity and the struggle for selfpreservation in a manner that other sports do not.305 Boxing’s
distinction between success and failure in boxing is clear (one either
wins or loses), the boxer must put his role-identity on the line.
Unlike some other sports (e.g., football, hockey, soccer), there are
no ties. Boxing is ultimately an individual rather than team effort.
There is no one to replace you; you cannot call time-out after you
have been knocked punch-drunk with a vicious uppercut to the chin.
You cannot rest when you have had the wind knocked out of you
with a sweeping hook to the mid-section.
Cortese, supra note 261, at *4-5.
304
Oates, supra note 1, at 20
305
Id at 20-21. Oates observed:
I have no difficulty justifying boxing as a sport because I have
never thought of it as a sport. . . There is nothing fundamentally
playful about it; nothing that seems to belong to daylight, to
pleasure. At its moments of greatest intensity it seems to contain so
complete and so powerful an image of life—life’s beauty,
vulnerability, despair, incalculable and often self-destructive
courage—that boxing is life, and hardly a mere game. During a
superior match . . . we are deeply moved by the body’s communion
with itself by way of another’s intransigent flesh. The body’s
dialogue with its shadow-self—or Death. Baseball, football,
basketball—these quintessentially American pastimes are
recognizably sports because they involve play: they are games. One
plays football, one does not play boxing.
Observing team sports, teams of adult men, one sees how men
are children in the most felicitous sense of the word. But boxing in
its elemental ferocity cannot be assimilated into childhood . . .
Spectators at public games derive much of their pleasure from
reliving the communal emotions of childhood but spectators at
boxing matches relive the murderous infancy of the race.
Considered in the abstract the boxing ring is an altar of sorts, one
of those legendary spaces where the laws of a nation are suspended:
inside the ropes, during an officially regulated three-minute round, a
man may be killed at his opponent’s hands but he cannot legally be
murdered. Boxing inhabits a sacred space predating civilization; or,
to use D.H. Lawrence’s phrase, before God was love. If it suggests a
savage ceremony or a rite of atonement it also suggests the futility
of such gestures. For what possible atonement is the fight waged if
it must shortly be waged against . . . and again? The boxing match is
the very image, the more terrifying for being so stylized, of
mankind’s collective aggression; its ongoing historical madness.
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exhibition of the individual in his most basic and savage state sets
it apart from other sports.306 Each boxer’s individual message of
survival and prowess combine in an expressive manner that
satisfies the Spence test.307 As to the first prong of Spence, the
fighter subjectively intends to communicate his ability to survive.
Further, as to the second prong, by participating in the sport,
spectators are likely to understand that the boxer is trying to do so.
As demonstrated by the decision in Top Rank, there are
significant policy interests weighing in favor of categorizing
boxing as protected speech. If the Top Rank decision stands, other
states will promulgate content-based taxes on pay-per-view boxing
programming similar to the Kershaw Act. Indeed, Pennsylvania
has already done so.308 This could exacerbate the current split
amongst courts that have examined boxing taxes. On the one hand,
Top Rank would allow content-based measures to stand. On the
other hand, TVKO and U.S. Satellite dictate that such measures are
repugnant to the First Amendment.
In addition, Florida’s Kershaw Act “imposes a financial
penalty on Direct Broadcast Satellite [(DBS)] providers that offer
viewers programming involving boxing, and ultimately penalizes
viewers themselves based on the content of the programs they
choose to watch.”309 The Kershaw Act thus limits programming
choices for viewers outside of Florida. Since DBS providers
broadcast identical telecasts to subscribers throughout the
continental United States, the Kershaw Act may cause DBS
providers not to offer programming that gives rise to the tax:
[where] DBS providers choose not to offer pay-per-view
telecasts involving boxing (or to offer fewer such telecasts)
Id. (emphasis in original). Thus, even individual sports such as figure skating,
where there would ostensibly be more potential for individualized expression,
do not transmit as powerful a message as boxing because they cannot provide
the same concentrated expression of the human condition as does boxing.
306
Id.
307
Spence, 418 U.S. at 410.
308
5 PA. CONS. STAT. § 916 (2004) (promoters must pay 3% tax on gross
receipts of in-state pay-per-view telecasts).
309
Brief for the Satellite Broadcasting and Communications Association as
Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioner, at 1. U.S. Satellite, 41 F. Supp. 2d 1113.
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because of the costs that Florida’s tax imposes on such
programming, then subscribers in other parts of the
country—including those states where courts have
invalidated taxes identical to Florida’s—may suffer a
corresponding decrease in available programming
content.310
A disparity among states’ regulation of satellite television
broadcasts would visit significant administrative burdens upon
pay-per-view providers. As a result, identical transmissions would
“[give] rise to differing obligations, depending on the jurisdiction
of the subscriber.”311
These increased burdens and costs, coupled with the decrease
in programming available to viewers resulting from taxes such as
the Kershaw Act, outweigh the importance of generating increased
revenue in a single state.
CONCLUSION
Florida is one of numerous states to authorize a tax specific to
telecasts of boxing. As these taxes are specific to a type of
television programming, they should be held by courts to be
content-based restrictions on speech. However, boxing and other
sports have been denied the protections of the First Amendment
because they are deemed to be non-expressive. An historical and
literary analysis of boxing demonstrates that the sport satisfies the
Spence test because boxers intend to express particularized
messages which are understood by their audiences. When strict
scrutiny is applied to taxes on boxing telecasts, the state’s interest
in raising revenue is outweighed by boxers’—and their
promoters’—freedom of expression.
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Br. for the Satellite Broadcasting and Communications Association as
Amicus Curiae in Supp. of Petitioner at 4-5.
311
Br. for the Satellite Broadcasting and Communications Association as
Amicus Curiae in Supp. of Petitioner at 13.

